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Abstract 
 
In this study it was examined whether Pairs trading is a potentially profitable 
trading strategy on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Pairs trading is a quantitative 
based trading strategy, in which shares are paired up based on a historic price 
relationship and traded accordingly, in a contrarian manner, when they diverge from 
said historical relationship. The essence of Pairs trading is to take advantage of 
perceived market inefficiencies, which is a direct contradiction of the Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis (even in its weak form).  
This study tested Pairs trading on both an unrestricted (any two shares can be 
paired), as well as a sector-restricted (only pairs within the RESI and the FINDI 
sectors could be paired), sample of shares (the JSE Top80 – based on market 
capitalization). Furthermore, a number of different signals (which are based on 
standard deviations) to open and close pairs were tested, on both the unrestricted and 
sector-restricted samples. The aim of using different samples of shares, as well as 
different trading signals, was to determine whether or not different strategies could 
serve to bolster the performance of a Pairs trading strategy.  
It was concluded that all tested strategies outperformed the ALSI in terms of 
cumulative before-fee returns. However, the high frequency of trading required to 
execute a Pairs trading strategy substantially eroded before-fee returns. Despite the 
high transaction costs incurred by Pairs trading, with the exception of one strategy, all 
of the strategies tested outperformed the ALSI on a net of brokerage fee returns basis. 
It, however, remains to be tested whether the strategy continues to outperform when 
scrip borrow costs, as well as higher levels of brokerage, are included. In addition to 
the more significant before- and after-fee returns yielded by Pairs trading (in 
comparison to the ALSI), Pairs Trading also resulted in lower standard deviations 
than the ALSI. Therefore engaging in a Pairs trading strategy appears to carry less 
risk than investing in the ALSI. Furthermore, it was concluded that applying sector 
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restrictions resulted in both decreased returns, as well as risk (as evidenced by lower 
standard deviations). However, the decreased returns were relatively greater than the 
decreased standard deviations, and thus led to lower Sharpe Ratios. 
Significantly, a decline in the performance of Pairs trading over time was 
observed – as documented in prior literature on foreign stock markets. Furthermore, 
Pairs trading appears to have relatively outperformed in periods of increased market 
stress (volatility) around 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Table of Contents 
 
1 Introduction        Page 9 
 
2 Literature Review       Page 12 
 2.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis     Page 12 
2.2 Returns of Pairs Trading      Page 13 
2.2.1 American Studies     Page 13 
2.2.1.1 Unrestricted Pairing    Page 13 
2.2.1.2 Restricted Pairing    Page 15 
2.2.1.3 Recent Pair Profitability    Page 16 
2.2.1.4 Robustness of Short Selling Costs   Page 17 
2.2.2 International Studies     Page 18 
2.2.2.1 Turkey      Page 18 
2.2.2.2 Brazil      Page 19 
2.3 Risks of Pairs Trading      Page 20 
2.3.1 American Studies     Page 20 
2.3.2 International Studies     Page 22 
2.4 Other Potential Drivers of Pairs Trading Returns   Page 23 
2.4.1 Bid-Ask Bounce      Page 23 
2.4.2 Short-Term Mean Reversals    Page 24 
2.5 Potential Drivers of Diminishing Returns    Page 25 
2.5.1 Increased Number of Hedge Funds    Page 25 
2.5.2 Market Volatility      Page 26 
2.5.3 Earnings Events      Page 27 
 
3 Data          Page 28 
 
4 Methodology        Page 29 
4.1 Pairs Formation       Page 29 
4.2 Trading Period       Page 31 
4.3 Excess Return Computation     Page 33 
4.4 Performance Comparisons      Page 34 
4.5 Scrip Borrow and Fees      Page 34 
4.6 Sharpe Ratio       Page 35 
 
5  Empirical Results        Page 37 
 5.1 Strategy Profits       Page 37 
  5.1.1 Unrestricted      Page 37 
   5.1.1.1 Unrestricted (2;0)     Page 37 
 4 
   5.1.1.2 Unrestricted (2;-0,5)    Page 44 
   5.1.1.3 Unrestricted (3;-0,5)    Page 51 
   5.1.1.4 Unrestricted (2;-1)     Page 59 
   5.1.1.5 Unrestricted (2;-2)     Page 66 
  5.1.2 Sector Restricted      Page 73 
   5.1.2.1 Sector Restricted (2;0)    Page 76 
   5.1.2.2 Sector Restricted (2;-2)    Page 82 
   5.1.2.3 Sector Restricted (2;-0,5)    Page 88 
 
 5.2 Comparison Over Time      Page 93 
  
6 Potential Topics for Future Research     Page 97 
7 Conclusion        Page 99 
8 Bibliography        Page 104 
9 Appendix        Page 106 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
List of Figures 
 
Methodology 
Figure A.1 Pairs Formation       Page 31 
Figure A.2 Trading Period       Page 33 
 
Unrestricted 
Figure 1  Before- and After-fee Returns – Unrestricted (2;0)   Page 40 
Figure 2  Before- and After-fee Returns – Unrestricted (2;-0,5)   Page 48 
Figure 3  Before- and After-fee Returns – Unrestricted (3;-0,5)   Page 56 
Figure 4  Before- and After-fee Returns – Unrestricted (2;-1)   Page 63 
Figure 5  Before- and After-fee Returns – Unrestricted (2;-2)   Page 72 
 
Sector Restricted 
Figure 6  Number of Mixed Pairs vs Return     Page 75 
Figure 7  Before- and After-fee Returns – Sector Restricted (2;0)  Page 79 
Figure 8  Before- and After-fee Returns – Sector Restricted (2;-2)  Page 87 
Figure 9  Before- and After-fee Returns – Sector Restricted (2;-0,5)  Page 91 
 
 Appendix 
 
Figure 10 Normalized Prices of Paired Shares + Open/Close of the Pair  Page 110 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
List of Tables 
 
Unrestricted 
Table 1.1 Returns Analysis – Unrestricted (2;0)    Page 37 
Table 1.2 After-Fee Analysis – Unrestricted (2;0)    Page 39 
Table 1.3 Top 20 Portfolio Risk and Return Drivers – Unrestricted (2;0)  Page 41 
Table 1.4 Profitability Analysis – Unrestricted (2;0)    Page 42 
Table 2.1 Returns Analysis – Unrestricted (2;-0,5)    Page 46 
Table 2.2 After-Fee Analysis – Unrestricted (2;-0,5)    Page 47 
Table 2.3 Top 20 Portfolio Risk and Return Drivers – Unrestricted (2;-0,5) Page 49 
Table 2.4 Profitability Analysis – Unrestricted (2;-0,5)    Page 50 
Table 3.1 Returns Analysis – Unrestricted (3;-0,5)    Page 52 
Table 3.2 After-Fee Analysis – Unrestricted (3;-0,5)    Page 55 
Table 3.3 Top 20 Portfolio Risk and Return Drivers – Unrestricted (3;-0,5) Page 53 
Table 3.4 Profitability Analysis – Unrestricted (3;-0,5)    Page 59 
Table 4.1 Returns Analysis – Unrestricted (2;-1)    Page 61 
Table 4.2 After-Fee Analysis – Unrestricted (2;-1)    Page 62 
Table 4.3 Top 20 Portfolio Risk and Return Drivers – Unrestricted (2;-1) Page 64 
Table 4.4 Profitability Analysis – Unrestricted (2;-1)     Page 65 
Table 5.1 Returns Analysis – Unrestricted (2;-2)    Page 67 
Table 5.2 After-Fee Analysis – Unrestricted (2;-2)    Page 71 
Table 5.3 Top 20 Portfolio Risk and Return Drivers – Unrestricted (2;-2) Page 69 
Table 5.4 Profitability Analysis – Unrestricted (2;-2)    Page 70 
 
Sector Restricted 
Table 6  Breakdown of Pairs Under Unrestricted Pairing   Page 74 
Table 7.1 Returns Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;0)    Page 77 
Table 7.2 After-Fee Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;0)    Page 78 
Table 7.3 Profitability Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;0)    Page 80 
Table 8.1 Returns Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;-2)    Page 82 
Table 8.2 After-Fee Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;-2)   Page 86 
Table 8.3 Profitability Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;-2)   Page 84 
Table 9.1 Returns Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;-0,5)   Page 88 
Table 9.2 After-Fee Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;-0,5)   Page 89 
Table 9.3 Profitability Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;-0,5)   Page 90 
 
Table 10.1 Comparison Over Time – Unrestricted (2;-2)   Page 93 
Table 10.2 Comparison Over Time – Unrestricted (2;0)    Page 95 
  
 7 
 
Appendix 
Table 11.1 Stock Ticker, Name and Sector     Page 107 
Table 11.2 A Portion of the SSD Matrix (Chosen Pairs Highlighted)  Page 109 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
R   Return 
SD   Standard Deviation 
SR   Sharpe Ratio 
ASSD   Average Sum of the Squared Distances 
ANOP   Average Number of Open Pairs 
NoT   Number of Trades 
ATL   Average Trade Length 
RPT   Return per Trade 
R(CC)   Return on Committed Capital 
R(FI)   Fully Invested Return 
JSE   Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
ALSI   All Share Index 
(2;0) Strategy notation – a strategy using an opening parameter of 2 standard 
deviations, and a closing parameter of 0 standard deviations.  
TP Trading Period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
1  Introduction 
 
Pairs trading became a popular investment strategy in the early 80’s when the 
Wall Street quant Nunzio Tartaglia (Gatev, Goetzman and Rouwenhorst, 2006) 
brought together a group of scientists from a number of different disciplines 
(mathematics, computer sciences etc). Tartaglia’s objective was to develop computer 
based trading platforms in which human subjectivity had no influence on investment 
decisions. For some time the team enjoyed positive outperformance, before 
dismantling after a period of sustained underperformance (Perlin, 2007). 
The theory behind Pairs trading is based on the assumption that when the 
prices of two shares have historically tended to trade with a constant price relationship, 
they can be viewed as economic substitutes. Any deviations from the observed 
historical price relationship are expected to re-converge to the historic mean. A 
deviation from the historic mean is seen as a market inefficiency, as economic 
substitutes are not trading at parity, which should be exploitable to earn profits. When 
the spread between the prices of two paired shares widens (with the assumption of 
future convergence), an investor engaging in a Pairs trading strategy will enter into a 
long position in the relative loser stock (expecting future relative gains) and a short 
position in the relative winner stock (expecting future relative loses). Pairs trading is 
thus of a contrarian nature, as humans tend to buy shares when they are increasing in 
price and sell them when they are decreasing in price. 
 Pairs trading is a violation of market efficiency theory. Fama (1970) 
elaborated on the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which, even in its weak form, 
postulates that the past trading information of a stock is already reflected in its price 
and therefore an investor cannot earn excessive returns using only historical market 
data. However, there are a number of papers that demonstrate, at least to some extent, 
that past information is able to predict future movements in stock prices, such as 
Pietranico and Riepe (2004) and Bouman and Jacobsen (2002).  
This study follows a similar methodology to the works carried out by Gatev, 
Goetzmann & Rouwenhorst (2006) and Do and Faff (2009) on the S&P500, Perlin 
(2007) on the Brazilian stock exchange and Bolgun, Kurun & Guven (2009) on the 
Turkish stock exchange. To this extent, pairs were formed through a process of 
minimizing the sum of the squared distances between the normalized prices of shares 
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within the Top80 on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Once pairs were 
formed, trading was simulated when the spread between the shares widened to a 
predetermined degree from the rolling historic mean, and closed upon subsequent 
convergence to a predetermined degree from the rolling mean. A number of strategies 
with differing opening and closing parameters have been simulated in order to 
determine whether predictable outperformance is possible. Furthermore, pair 
formation has been conducted on both an Unrestricted (any two shares within the 
Top80 can form a pair) and a Sector Restricted (only shares from within the Resi or 
Findi sectors can form a pair) basis.  
This study concludes that, between January 1998 and May 2012, Pairs trading 
strategies outperformed the All Share Index (ALSI) in terms of both return and risk 
(as evidenced by lower standard deviations). The outperformance was robust to a 
level of brokerage costs that an institutional investor could expect to pay, while the 
costs associated with scrip borrow were not included in this study. Outperformance 
was also noted on an Unrestricted basis, when compared to the Sector Restricted 
strategies. As concluded in Gatev et al. (2006) and Do and Faff (2009), returns 
yielded by Pairs trading appear to have drastically declined over time.  
According to Chng (2007), there are a number of reasons for the popularity of 
Pairs trading. Firstly, the investment process is easy to understand as well as execute. 
Secondly, it does not require valuation models, which are subject to wide error 
margins. The lack of the necessity of valuation models stems from the fact that 
positions opened when engaging in Pairs trading are generally relatively close to 
market neutral, and trade signals are generated on relative valuations. Thirdly, the 
investment style is sufficiently flexible to accommodate various investment styles. 
Furthermore, the positions rarely require intraday re-balancing, and thus making Pairs 
trading a feasibly profitable strategy as transaction costs are substantially lower than 
an intraday trading strategy would incur, however, transaction costs remain relatively 
high in comparison to a more fundamental based investment approach. And lastly, 
trading can be automated. Due to Pairs trading generally being a relatively market 
neutral investment strategy, underperformance relative to the market is expected in a 
bull market, where net long positions should outperform. Conversely, Pairs trading is 
expected to outperform in both bear and static markets (as long as realized volatility is 
relatively high).  
 11 
Section 2 of this study provides an analysis of previously published literature 
on the EMH and Pairs trading, which is followed by a brief description of the raw 
data used in this study in Section 3. The Methodology of the study is then described in 
Section 4. Section 5 is a report on the Empirical Results of the study, while Section 6 
suggests potential topics for future research. The conclusion of the study is drawn up 
in Section 7, which is followed by the Bibliography and Appendix in Sections 8 and 9 
respectively. 
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2  Literature Review 
 
There is limited prior research on Pairs trading due its proprietary nature. To 
the best of my knowledge this is the first study to test whether or not Pairs trading is a 
profitable trading strategy on the Equity Market of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE).  
The most widely cited study on Pairs trading is by Gatev, Goetzman and 
Rouwenhorst (1999) and (2006), which had a follow up study by Do and Faff (2009), 
both studies tested a Pairs trading strategy on the S&P500. Gatev et al. (1999) found 
that Pairs trading was able to generate statistically significant after-fee returns on the 
S&P500. However, in a follow up paper, Gatev et al. (2006) concluded that, while 
Pairs trading remained profitable on the S&P500, the profitability was declining over 
time. It was still concluded that suitably paired shares were able to generate 
statistically significant excess returns. Do and Faff (2009) further concluded that the 
trend in declining profitability had persisted, and at an increasing rate. 
There are three proposed manners in which shares can be paired, namely the 
minimum squared distance methodology as used in Gatev et al. (2006), Do and Faff 
(2009) and Nath (2003). The cointegration method as proposed by Vidyamurthy 
(2004) and lastly the Stochastic Spread application as proposed by Elliot, van der 
Hoek and Malcom (2004). This study will focus on the most widely cited minimum 
squared distance methodology, as used in Gatev et al. (2006) and Do and Faff (2009). 
 
2.1  The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) was first hypothesized in Fama 
(1965), and then elaborated upon in Fama (1970), when it was separated into three 
forms of efficiency. The three forms of market efficiency, in ascending order of 
strictness, are Weak Form, Semi-strong Form and Strong Form. Weak Form 
efficiency states that market prices correctly represent all past publically available 
information. Semi-strong Form efficiency states that market prices reflect all 
publically available information – both past and current. Strong Form efficiency takes 
it further, stating that all information is reflected in market prices, including insider 
information and future information.  
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Pairs trading aims to generate statistical outperformance based on observed 
historical price relationships, and the subsequent divergence from and convergence to 
the said relationship. Thus, should positive outperformance of Pairs trading be 
possible, it will prove a violation of the EMH, even in its weak form. 
A number of pieces of prior literature have already disproved the EMH, 
particularly in its stricter forms. Seasonal effects on stock prices were demonstrated in 
Pietranico and Riepe (2004), who concluded that a phenomenon dubbed the January 
Effect exists, and that small-cap shares tend to outperform on the first few trading 
days of a new year. Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) found evidence of lower market 
returns between May and October.  
Fama (1998) postulated that investors tend to both over- and under-react to 
information, while Hirschleifer (2001) discussed investor conservatism. 
 
2.2  Returns of Pairs Trading  
2.2.1  American Studies 
2.2.1.1  Unrestricted Pairing 
 
Gatev et al. (2006) tested a Pairs trading strategy on the S&P500. The signal 
for opening a position was a spread of 2 historic standard deviations (from a 125 day 
rolling mean) between the paired shares. Positions were closed when the two shares 
returned to their historic price equilibrium (a 0 standard deviation spread). It was 
concluded that excess returns yielded by a Pairs trading strategy were both positive 
and statistically significant, even after reasonable estimates of transaction costs. This 
finding held true for both the sample period, as well as a 4-year out of sample period 
(to reduce data snooping error). However, over time a decline in profitability was 
noted, which was observed by splitting the sample at the end of 1988. In a later study, 
Do and Faff (2009) noted the decline in profitability of Pairs trading to have 
continued, and the excess returns yielded by Pairs trading to have become statistically 
insignificant as a whole. However, Do and Faff (2009) concluded that, with better 
methods of stock picking, significant excess returns could still be achieved – with 
more than 50% of the top pairs (pairs with the smallest sum of squared differences 
between their normalized price series’) still having been profitable, or highly 
profitable. 
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Gatev et al. (2006) measured excess returns in two manners, firstly on a fully 
invested portfolio and secondly on a more conservative manner of measuring returns 
on committed capital. The committed capital return measure is based on the number 
of pairs selected for trading – whether or not a pair trades during the period, it is 
included in the excess return calculation (and should it not have traded, it would result 
in a drag on the return of the strategy). The fully invested portfolio only includes pairs 
that trade during the period in the excess return calculation.  
In addition, two different portfolios were tested. The first included the top 5 
pairs and the second included the top 20 pairs (the top pair being defined as the pair 
with the smallest sum of its squared distances, and thus the closest historical 
relationship). Without a sector pairing constraint, the excess return to the 5 pair 
portfolio was 1.31% per month (t-stat of 8.74) for the fully invested portfolio and 
0.78% per month for the committed capital approach. The 20 pair portfolio yielded 
excess returns of 1.44% (t-stat of 11.56) and 0.81% per month respectively. Excess 
returns were found to be significant in both an economic and statistical sense. In 
addition, it was observed that the standard deviation of returns decreased as the 
number of shares increased, leading to a larger positive skewness coefficient. The 
observation period contained 464 months of data, of these, the 5 pair portfolio had 
124 months of negative return, while the 20 pair portfolio only had 71 months of 
negative returns. 
Do and Faff (2009) replicated the Gatev et al. (1999) and Gatev et al. (2006) 
papers, their findings were roughly consistent with the 1999 paper and there were 
some marginal differences in comparison to the 2006 paper.  
Do and Faff (2009) reported an average monthly return of 0.34% (for the top 
20 pair portfolio) for the 1989-2002 period, which is roughly consistent with Gatev et 
al. (2006) who reported a return of 0.38%. This figure was already a 60% decline on 
the earlier 1962-1988 sub-period. Furthermore, Do and Faff (2009) concluded that the 
average monthly return declined to only 0.06% in the latest 2003-2008 period and the 
corresponding t-statistic suggests that this was not significantly different from 0.  
The probability of achieving a negative monthly return increased from 19% in 
the 1962-1988 period to 31% in the 1989-2002 period, and finally to 53% in the most 
recent 2003-2008 period, according to Do and Faff (2009).  
Gatev et al. (2006) noted a number of observations in the composition of 
portfolios when pairing was Unrestricted. Positions generally opened and closed a 
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number of times over a long period, with neither stock being a ‘leader’ (moves away 
from the median tended to happen in both directions, requiring that both long and 
short positions were entered into on both shares at different times during the period of 
study). The average duration of an open position was 3.75 months, making Pairs 
trading a medium term investment horizon. Two thirds of pairs were from different 
size deciles and significantly, 71% of pairs were within the utility sector (utility 
shares historically have tended to have lower volatilities).  
 
2.2.1.2  Restricted Pairing 
 
 Both Do and Faff (2009) and Gatev et al. (2006) found benefits to restricting 
the pairing of shares to within the same sector (the four sectors in both papers were 
the Utilities, Financials, Transportation and Industrials sectors). Under a strategy with 
no restrictions on the pairing of shares, Gatev et al. (2006) noted that well below 50% 
of paired shares were mixed pairs (from different sectors) due to shares within sectors 
being influenced by similar exogenous factors (for example, Financial shares are 
more exposed to a change in the repo rate than shares from different sectors). 
Both Gatev et al. (2006) and Do and Faff (2009) concluded that pairs formed 
from the Utilities and Financial sectors tended to outperform pairs formed from the 
Industrials and Transportation sectors.  
Gatev et al. (2006) concluded that all 4 sectors showed statistically significant 
positive excessive returns. Using the top 20 pairs (based on a minimum value of the 
sum of the squared distances between the shares’ normalized price series’) in each 
sector, Gatev et al. (2006) found that Utilities yielded 1.08% per month (t-stat of 
10.26), Financials yielded 0.78% per month (t-stat of 7.6), Industrials yielded 0.61% 
(t-stat of 6.93) and Transportation yielded 0.58% (t-stat of 4.26). These returns were 
generally skewed to the right and showed positive kurtosis. 
Do and Faff (2009) tested whether Utilities and Financials remained profitable 
in the later period (2003-2008). They concluded that pairs from the Utilities sector 
averaged returns that were 9bps/month higher than an unconditional portfolio for the 
entire sample and significantly, in the 2003-2008 period they yielded returns that were 
12bps/month higher and were statistically significant. Pairs from within the Financials 
sector averaged 16bps/month higher returns than pairs from the unconditional 
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portfolio for both the entire sample and the 2003-2008 period. However, the 
outperformance of the Financial pairs was statistically insignificant. Pairs from within 
the Utilities sector yielded the lowest non-convergence risk, despite the fact that the 
sector contained the highest number of non-convergent pairs. This was due to the 
non-convergent pairs in the utilities sector having yielded a smaller average loss of -
4.88%, compared to financials losing on average -7.54% (unconditional: -6.39%). 
Both Do and Faff (2009) and Gatev et al. (2006) postulate that pairs from 
within the Utilities sector tend to perform well under a Pairs trading strategy because 
the companies face stable demands and products within the sector are fairly 
homogenous. Thus, shares within the Utilities sector are more likely to be economic 
substitutes than shares in other sectors. Similarly, the outperformance of the 
Financials sector is pinned on the fact that the companies in the Financials sector are 
sensitive to common factors (interest rate risk, levels of unemployment etc.) and thus 
prices are more likely to be cointegrated. Industrial companies however, can be 
fundamentally very different from one another (for example, a healthcare company 
and a supermarket chain are not likely to be influenced by similar exogenous factors, 
and are thus likely to perform relatively poorly under a Pairs trading strategy). 
 
2.2.1.3  Recent Pair Profitability 
 
Do and Faff (2009) tested whether both the decline in profitability and the 
increased risk of continued pair divergence applied to the wider market, or just the 
previously tested 20 pairs. To do so, they conducted an analysis of the top 50 pairs on 
the S&P500. The average monthly excess return yielded by the top 50 pair portfolio 
was very similar to that of the top 20 pair portfolio, proving that excess returns were 
not merely restricted to the top 20 pairs. In addition, the standard deviation of the top 
50 pairs was lower than that of the top 20 pairs, highlighting benefits of 
diversification in a Pairs trading strategy. It was noted that, in the most recent period, 
55% (17%) of the top 20 pairs were still profitable, which is comparable to the 56% 
(22%) of the top 50 pairs still being profitable. Do and Faff (2009) concluded that 
increasing the pairs from 20 to 50,Pairs trading remained profitable in the later period 
through more opportunities of pair formation. 
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2.2.1.4  Robustness of Short Selling Costs 
 
Gatev et al. (2006) questioned why the prices of economic substitutes (in this 
case, paired shares) ever diverge, and they postulated that it is due to random liquidity 
shocks that aren’t able to be exploited due to the costs associated with short selling 
securities. There are two types of costs associated with short selling. Firstly, specials, 
which are the explicit costs that arise from short selling. Secondly, as concluded by 
D’Avolio (2002) there are further costs associated with short recalls, which are 
potentially costly because they may deprive arbitrageurs of their profits.  
Gatev et al. (2006) concluded that specials have minimal effects on large 
shares, which is a similar conclusion to D’Avolio (2002) and Getczy et al. (2002). 
The test was done by restricting pairs of shares to the top three size deciles, the 
resultant returns yielded by the top 20 portfolio declined by 2 bps per month, while 
the top 5 portfolio’s returns increased slightly. After factoring in liquidity, returns 
changed little and remained statistically significant, hence Gatev et al. (2006) 
concluded that illiquid shares trading on special have little effect on Pairs trading 
returns.  
Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) and D’Avolio (2002) concluded that short 
recalls are driven by dispersion of opinion. Gatev et al. (2006) used high trade volume 
as a proxy for divergence of opinion (an increased number of both buyers and sellers), 
and concluded that profits remained large and positive, thus Pairs trading profits 
persisted even when shorts were recalled.  
Gatev et al. (2006) concluded that profits of Pairs trading are robust with 
regards to short selling costs and persist when trading large shares (that aren’t trading 
on special) as well as when shorts are recalled. Furthermore, for better-positioned 
investors such as large institutions or hedge funds, Pairs trading profits are likely to 
remain essentially unaffected due to relatively favourable costs associated with short 
selling. 
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2.2.2  International Studies 
2.2.2.1 Turkey 
 
Bolgun et al. (2009) tested whether Pairs trading is a feasible investment 
strategy on the Istanbul Stock Exchange, using the ISE-30 index. Shares were paired 
through the use of the minimum squared distance methodology as was done in Gatev 
et al. (2006) and were not Sector Restricted, leaving potential room for future study. 
The period of the study was 2002-2008.  
The signal used to open a position was a 2.5 historical standard deviation 
spread from the historic rolling mean. Open positions were closed when the spread 
reverted to a 0.5 historic standard deviation move from the rolling historic mean. It is 
noted that the spreads to open and close positions in pairs are different to those 
utilized in Gatev et al. (2006) and Do and Faff (2009), and thus direct comparisons 
are potentially misleading. A take profit was in place at 3% of the initial position and 
a stop loss at 2% of the position value.  
According to Bolgun et al. (2009), the Turkish stock market provides a 
number of challenges with regards to the short sale of stock, due to market 
inefficiencies and institutions being acutely aware of counterparty risk (and thus 
pricing default risk into scrip borrowing costs or not offering scrip borrow at all). This 
makes the transaction costs of Pairs trading more costly on the Turkish stock market 
than in other countries with more liquid markets for scrip borrow, such as the S&P500. 
Bolgun et al. (2009) undertook an analysis of Value-at-Risk (VaR) measures 
of Pairs trading, as VaR can be used as a gauge as to the level of potential leverage 
that an investor can (relatively safely) apply when engaging in a Pairs trading strategy. 
It is also noted that one should not rely too heavily on historic VaR measures, 
however, the results suggest that Pairs trading is exposed to relatively little risk. The 
three mean measures of VaR were analyzed, namely the Variance Covariance method 
(VCV), the Historical Simulation Method (HS) and the Monte Carlo methodology. 
The HS method underestimated the loss of the portfolio for only 8 out of 1627 days as 
opposed to 15 for the VCV method and 28 for the Monte Carlo simulation; thus it is 
suggested that the HS method is used in practice to minimize error. 
Pairs trading appears to have outperformed the ISE-30 index before fees, with 
Bolgun et al. (2009) having documented annualized before-fee excess returns of 
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3.32% when compared to a naïve buy and hold strategy of the index. The average 
daily return on the IMKB-30 for the period of study was 0.06% with a daily volatility 
of 2.20%, while the Pairs trading portfolio yielded 0.12% with a volatility of 1.67%. 
The higher return, coupled with a lower standard deviation, resulted in the Pairs 
trading strategy having a substantially higher Sharpe Ratio in comparison to the naïve 
buy and hold strategy of the index. However, Bolgun et al. (2009) noted that trading 
commissions and scrip borrowing costs are generally greater than the excess before-
fee returns generated by a Pairs trading strategy on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 
It is suggested that a follow up paper is done on the ISE, as adding constraints 
in the stock pairings (such as sector limitations etc) will potentially yield more 
favourable results. 
 
2.2.2.2 Brazil 
 
In his working paper, Perlin (2007) tested whether a Pairs trading strategy is a 
feasible investment strategy on the Brazilian stock exchange. He used the 100 most 
liquid shares on the exchange and the period of study was 2000-2006. He concluded 
that Pairs trading was a profitable and possibly market neutral (due to equal long and 
short positions invested in shares that have historically traded at a constant price 
relationship) investment strategy. Data was tested from three different frequencies 
(daily, weekly and monthly), and was compared to a naïve buy and hold strategy of 
the index, as well as a bootstrap method of random stock pairing. Shares were paired 
using the minimum squared distance rule of normalized prices, which is the same 
methodology that was applied in Gatev et al. (2006), Do and Faff (2009) and Bolgun 
et al. (2009). Perlin (2007) allowed a stock to be paired to more than one other stock, 
and thus a stock could generate both a buy and a sell signal at the same time (against 
two different shares).  
With regards to raw return (clean return yielded by the strategy minus 
transaction costs), Perlin (2007) found that the long positions tended to be 
substantially more profitable than the short positions for all frequencies. He 
concluded that this is due to the upward trend of the stock market for the period of 
study.  
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When excess returns were analyzed, it was found that the Pairs trading 
strategy was able to outperform the properly weighted naïve portfolio under the 
majority of cases – predominantly for a daily frequency (for the interval of d between 
1.5 and 2) and the monthly frequency (for all values of d). 1  Pairs trading 
outperformed the bootstrapped method of pair formation in just a few cases, primarily 
daily data with d between 1.5 and 2. It also appeared that there was positive 
outperformance for monthly data with d between 2.6 and 3, but the low frequency of 
trades made this observation statistically insignificant.  
The superiority of the higher frequencies (daily) is logically consistent with 
the objective of Pairs trading, namely, taking advantage of the corrections that follow 
market inefficiencies. Market inefficiencies are likely to be corrected quickly due to 
the number of informed investors in the market – the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
even hypothesizes that one cannot profit from market inefficiencies. 
Perlin (2007) also examined the resultant Jensen’s Alphas of their Pairs 
trading strategy. 2  Most of the Jensen’s Alphas were found to be positive but 
statistically insignificant. The Beta’s of the portfolios were all very close to zero, and, 
barring one, they were statistically insignificant.  
It was concluded by Perlin (2007) that Pairs trading on the Brazilian stock 
exchange was a moderately profitable strategy in the past and, furthermore, an almost 
market neutral strategy. Similarly to Bolgun et al. (2009), Perlin (2007) didn’t add 
constraints such as Sector Restriction into their pairing, and thus there is room for 
future improvement in the results of this study. 
 
2.3   Risks of Pairs Trading 
2.3.1  American Studies 
 
Gatev et al. (2006) found that, for the period spanning from 1963 to 2002, the 
standard deviation of a Pairs trading portfolio was between a half and a third of the 
                                                
1 Perlin (2007) used the variable d, making it arbitrary and used it as a filter for 
creating a trading signal. The value cannot be very high; otherwise too few trades will 
be opened, and similarly, can’t be too small, as too many trades will be opened, which 
will lead to very high transaction costs. The variable is essentially a measure of the 
standard deviation spread required to open a trade. 
2 Jensen’s Alpha is a risk-adjusted performance measure; it measures a portfolios 
excess return on the market after adjusting for the portfolios Beta. 
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standard deviation of the S&P500. Furthermore, individual pairs tended to be near 
market neutral, with their market exposures small and generally statistically 
insignificant (particularly when applying Sector Restrictions to the formation of pairs). 
It was tested whether or not a difference between large and small shares, as well as 
between value and growth shares changed the risk/return payoffs yielded by a Pairs 
trading strategy, and it was concluded that the difference was statistically insignificant. 
With regards to VaR, the portfolio of 20 pairs of shares tended to have a smaller VaR 
than a portfolio of 5 pairs of shares (a worst day VaR of 6.72% vs 10.08% 
respectively). Thus, the benefits of diversification when engaging in a Pairs trading 
strategy are evident. 
 It was postulated by Gatev et al. (2006) that there is a dormant risk factor 
inherent in a Pairs trading strategy that isn’t captured by conventional risk measures. 
This dormant risk factor (or dormant risk factors) became apparent during the sub 
period analysis, when the sample period was split at the end of 1988. Significantly, 
the later period yielded a substantially lower return, marked by a decrease from 
118bps to 38bps per month. However, the risk adjusted return decreased substantially 
less drastically, from 67bps to 42bps per month (with t-stats of 4.41 and 3.77 
respectively). A change in factor exposures and factor volatilities were thus only able 
to explain part of the lower returns, but not the risk adjusted returns. The dormant risk 
factor was tested through stock correlations in the different sub-periods, as well as the 
entire sample (between the top 20 shares and the 101-120 shares). The full sample 
correlations were 0.48, while the sub-periods’ correlations were 0.51 and 0.18 for the 
pre- and post-1988 periods respectively. In addition the correlation between Fama-
French-Momentum-Reversion residuals was tested, and 0.41, 0.42 and 0.20 were the 
correlations for the full sample, pre-1988 and post-1988 respectively. Clearly returns 
were higher in the earlier period, where both correlations and rolling correlations, 
were higher. Gatev et al. (2006) concluded that the substantial difference in the 
correlations between the sub periods highlights the fact that there was a dormant risk 
factor that was more prevalent in the earlier period. Therefore, the higher returns in 
the earlier sub-period were the reward for taking on additional unmeasured risk.  
 Do and Faff (2009) documented the increased trend with which pairs continue 
to diverge from their historic mean instead of re-converging, resulting in an increase 
in the fundamental risks of Pairs trading. This increase in pairs’ diversion causes the 
Law of One Price to not hold for sufficiently long investment horizons, increasing the 
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risk of losses to a Pairs trading strategy. A number of possible reasons were 
postulated and tested by Do and Faff (2009), which will be covered in a later section 
(2.5) of the literature review (namely ‘Potential Drivers Of Diminishing Returns’). It 
was concluded that the divergence problem is not caused by higher market volatility, 
but by a gradual change in the markets’ perception of the relative values of paired 
securities. The Law of One Price was defined in Ingersoll (1987) and expanded upon 
in Chen and Knez (1995). It suggests that two similar shares should trade at the same 
price. Therefore, two shares that have historically traded at similar prices should 
continue to trade at similar prices, unless there is a fundamental shift in either share. 
Herlemont (2004) suggested a number of rules that an investor can use to 
reduce their risk exposure. Firstly, he suggests a way for an investor to avoid the 
further divergence of the spread between two shares after opening a position. The 
investor should wait for the signal generation band to be breached a second time 
before opening the position, in other words; the position should only be opened when 
the spread has already begun to converge. Secondly, it is suggested that an investor 
should stipulate a maximum holding period for an open position, and Herlemont 
(2004) suggested a period of 50 days, as the average reversion period was found to be 
around 35 days. The assumption behind this is that the spread should, based on past 
observations, have reverted to the historical mean in this time period if it is going to 
converge, it also avoids losing the time value of money. Furthermore, Herlemont 
(2004) suggests that systematic market risk can be avoided by pairing shares with 
similar Beta’s (ensuring that the pair is essentially, barring the fact that a shares beta 
can change over time, perfectly market neutral) to the market. However matching 
pairs based on their Beta’s will severely restrict the number of pairs that can be 
formed. Herlemont (2004) suggests that the analysis of Beta spreads should be 
conducted and a maximum spread enforced (a spread of 0.2 was suggested). Lastly, 
Herlemont (2004) suggested that a stop-loss trigger should be added to any Pairs 
trading strategy. 
 
2.3.2  International Studies 
 
Perlin (2007), in his study of Pairs trading on the Brazilian stock exchange, 
examined the Jensen’s Alphas that were yielded by a Pairs trading strategy. The 
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majority of Jensen’s Alphas for the daily frequency were found to be positive, 
although not statistically significant. These findings highlight that Pairs trading (for a 
daily frequency) tended to have a positive constant return after filtering for market 
conditions and risks, however, these findings weren’t statistically significant. The 
analysis of portfolio Beta’s (for all 3 frequencies – daily, weekly and monthly) shows 
that they were all very close to zero, but only one was significant, and only at the 10% 
level. The low values of portfolio’s Beta’s generated by a Pairs trading strategy 
highlights that the strategy was close to market neutrality. 
Bolgun et al. (2009) hypothesized that factors of market incompleteness (ex-
dividend date jumps etc.) and market frictions (transaction costs, financing costs, 
immediacy etc.) make Pairs trading a more difficult strategy to implement, and result 
in lower returns. Both Bolgun et al. (2009) and Do and Faff (2009) suggest that noise 
trader risk is prevalent in a Pairs trading strategy. Bolgun et al. (2009) defines noise 
trader risk as “…where the fundamental economic values of the two securities, based 
on ultimate payoffs, are exactly the same, but the aggregate of informed and 
uninformed investors trades them at even more disparate prices than when the spread 
was opened.” Thus, both Bolgun et al. (2009) and Do and Faff (2009) highlighted the 
risk of further divergence of the shares in an open pair. Pairs trading portfolios on the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange outperformed the ISE-30 in terms of both return, as well as 
volatility (a daily volatility of 1.67% compared to the markets daily volatility of 
2.20%). 
 
2.4   Other Potential Drivers of Pairs Trading Returns 
2.4.1  Bid-Ask Bounce 
 
Jegadeesh (1990), Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) and Conrad and Kaul (1989) 
postulated that contrarian trading strategies’ excess returns contain an upward bias 
due to a Bid-Ask Bounce. Due to Pairs trading being a contrarian investment strategy, 
the investor is likely to be able to take the long positions at prices close to bid quotes 
and take the short positions at prices close to the ask quotes. Bid-Ask Bounce is based 
on the theory that an investor can buy cheap (due to, on average, the market trying to 
exit positions on the way down) and sell expensive (due to, on average, the market 
wanting to enter positions on the way up) due to the contrarian nature of selling the 
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winner and buying the loser, which is likely to cause an upward bias in the reported 
returns.  
 Gatev et al. (2006) tested whether Bid-Ask Bounce was a driving force behind 
the returns generated by Pairs trading’s by only opening and closing positions the day 
after the signal was generated. The price on the following day is equally likely to be at 
the prior day’s bid or ask price, and therefore Bid-Ask Bounce bias will be halved. 
Gatev et al. (2006) found that average monthly excess returns on fully invested 
portfolios and on committed capital portfolios dropped by 30-55bps and 20-35bps 
respectively. It was noted that part of the reduction in returns was from true mean 
reversion in prices and part was due to Bid-Ask Bounce bias. The portion attributable 
to each is difficult to quantify. 
 
2.4.2  Short-Term Mean Reversals 
 
Both Lehmann (1990) and Jegadeesh (1990) documented that contrarian 
investment strategies, including Pairs trading, benefit from short-term mean reversals. 
Gatev et al. (2006) examined whether reversals are the main driving force behind 
Pairs trading’s excess returns and concluded that, while the returns of the two 
strategies are positively correlated, price reversals are not an explanatory factor for 
Pairs trading’s outperformance.  
Gatev et al. (2006) conducted this test through a bootstrap methodology 
comparing the returns of the paired shares to returns of randomly selected pairs. 
Randomly paired shares were chosen with similar one-month prior returns on the 
shares as the actual pair. It was found that the excess returns yielded by the random 
pairs were slightly negative, and the standard deviations were larger in comparison to 
the pairs formed based on a historical relationship. Thus, it was concluded that simple 
mean reversion could not be the explanatory force behind Pairs trading’s 
outperformance. 
Furthermore, Gatev et al. (2006) hypothesized that, should Pairs trading’s 
excess returns be driven by mean reversion, the abnormal returns yielded by the 
strategy should be equal from both the long and the short positions (the opening of the 
position is equally likely to be triggered by a move in the price of either of the shares). 
However, it was found that the majority of the excess returns were due to the short 
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position, with the returns yielded by the long position insignificantly different from 
zero. Should part of the study have occurred during a bull market, it would be feasible 
that the majority of the excess return yielded by the strategy should have been 
generated through the long position. Thus, short-term mean reversion is unlikely to be 
the main driver behind Pairs trading outperformance. 
 
 
2.5  Potential drivers of diminishing returns 
 
Do and Faff (2009) concluded that the increased rate of persistent divergence 
of shares in open pairs is the main driving force behind the decreased profitability of 
Pairs trading over time. Furthermore, it was concluded that this divergence is more 
likely to be a gradual, sustainable, shift in the market perception of relative values, as 
opposed to sudden fundamental changes. 
 
 
2.5.1  Increased number of hedge funds 
 
A common hypothesis for the diminishing, and ultimately statistically 
insignificant, returns yielded by Pairs trading has often been pinned on an increasing 
number of hedge funds. The hypothesis states that the increased numbers of hedge 
funds are all competing for the same price discrepancies, and therefore the 
discrepancies are likely to be eliminated more rapidly, leaving lower potential profits 
available to the funds. Do and Faff (2009) found evidence that disproves this 
argument. 
Do and Faff (2009) split pairs into four groups, the first for pairs that never 
opened, the second for pairs that opened and never converged, the third group was 
pairs that completed one round trip (a trade was opened and closed) and the fourth 
group was for pairs that completed more than one round trip. Group 2 are the pairs 
that generate the most risk for a portfolio of paired shares, while group 4 is the most 
profitable set of pairs. Do and Faff (2009) postulated that increased competition 
between hedge funds would cause a reduction in pairs belonging to group 4 and an 
increase in groups 1 and 3. The theory is that the prices of paired shares wouldn’t 
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diverge as much (or as frequently) due to an increased number of funds attempting to 
profit from the potential arbitrage opportunity. Pairs in group 2 made up 26% of the 
population in the 1962-1988 period, which increased to 39% in the 1989-2002 period 
and then 42% in the latest 2003-2008 period. A decline in the number of pairs in 
group 4 was observed, from 42% to 24% and furthermore to 21%, while the 
percentage of pairs in groups 1 and 3 remained fairly constant. 
Do and Faff (2009) also noted that the increased number of pairs in group 2 
highlights an increased risk, over time, to investors. This increased risk would be 
likely push rational investors out of the market, and thus competition between hedge 
funds should have decreased over time.  
Two further observations that served to disprove the increased competition 
argument were; firstly, in the presence of increased competition, the spread should 
narrow on the trading day following the opening of a pair (assuming that investors are 
using the same information, and trading according to the same signals). Do and Faff 
(2009) observed that the spread in fact tended to widen on the day following the 
opening of a pair, however, this was not statistically significant. Secondly, it was 
hypothesized that should there be increased competition in the Pairs trading market, 
divergences in the spread should correct more quickly, and Do and Faff (2009) noted 
the opposite effect. Pairs in group 3 (assuming a 2 standard deviation in the spread) 
took on average 34 days to converge in the 1962-1988 sub period, increasing to 36.75 
and 38.79 days in the 1989-2002 and 2003-2008 sub periods respectively. Group 4 
pairs initially took on average 19.25 days, increasing to 20.94 days and 23.72 days 
respectively. 
 
2.5.2  Market Volatility 
 
  Do and Faff (2009) suggested that increased volatility of the market could 
possibly be the driving force behind the increasing trend in non-convergent pairs. 
Increased market volatility could lead to increased levels of noise trading, which can 
drive further divergence. 
 By regressing the divergence rate of pairs to the relevant six-month standard 
deviation of the return on the S&P500 index, Do and Faff (2009) tested the 
relationship of increased market volatility and the continued divergence in pairs’ 
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spreads. If a positive relationship is found, it can be concluded that increased market 
volatility drives divergence in pairs. The findings, however, for the entire sample, as 
well as the pre 1989 sub period, were of a negative relationship. The relationship was 
found to be statistically insignificant in the later periods, and therefore, Do and Faff 
(2009) concluded that, at most, increased market volatility played a small part in 
increasing the frequency of pairs divergence. 
  
2.5.3  Earnings Events 
 
Papadakis and Wysocki (2007) concluded that accounting events (such as 
earnings announcements and analysts forecasts) can cause a drift in the relative prices 
of paired shares due to investor under-reaction. A drift in relative prices around these 
events could cause Pairs trading to be less profitable. However, this study was limited 
to a small number of paired shares and results weren’t examined for the possibility of 
a strategy that avoids these events.  
Significantly, earnings events occur more frequently in recent years, and 
therefore it was hypothesized that they could be a driving force behind the 
diminishing returns of Pairs trading. 
Do and Faff (2009) concluded that earnings announcements were not a driving 
force behind pairs continuing to diverge. The Gatev et al. (2006) algorithm was 
modified by Do and Faff (2009) so that if a signal to open a position occurred within 
5 days after an earnings announcement the position would not be opened. The overall 
excess return was not different from the unconditional algorithm, but the later sub 
period of 2002-2008 yielded marginally higher returns. Pairs in groups 3 and 4 
experienced a greater number of event induced divergences than pairs in group 2, 
which further suggests that an increased rate of divergence is driven primarily by 
gradual shifts in market perception rather than by market shocks. 
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3  Data  
 
The daily total return, adjusted for reinvested dividends and corporate actions, 
for the Top 80 securities listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange ranked by 
market capitalization as at 2012/04/26 – was collected from DataStream. The period 
of study runs from 1998/01/21, through until 2012/04/26. A list of the shares in the 
sample and their relevant sectors is available in the Appendix.  
Selecting shares on the basis of a static market cap has the potential to lead to 
look-ahead bias in the results, due to including a relatively large number of shares that 
previously outperformed. However, a Pairs trading strategy is market neutral as it 
requires that equal long and short positions are taken in paired shares when opening a 
position. Thus, while the look-ahead bias would positively affect the long position, it 
would equally have a negative effect on the short position. Thus, look-ahead bias in a 
Pairs trading strategy is not likely to be material. Furthermore, a benefit of a static 
market cap is a constant investment horizon in which no shares delist during the 
period of study. 
Having selected the shares in the study at the end date will cause the study to 
include a higher proportion of previous winners than a constantly rebalanced ranking. 
This is likely to cause a disproportionate percentage of profits to be generated from 
the long positions in each pair. It should also be noted that due Pairs trading being 
almost market neutral (equal long and short positions are opened concurrently) a 
higher proportion of past winners would cause the trading strategy to appear to either 
underperform the market by a larger degree or to be less profitable with respect to the 
market.  
For returns comparisons, daily returns to the All Share Index (ALSI) for the 
period 11/06/2002 to 26/04/2012 were collected off INET BFA. The collected returns 
are before associated trading costs for the ALSI, however, investing in an index 
generally incurs comparably low fees – particularly in comparison to a quantitative 
strategy.  
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The data is analyzed using Microsoft Excel 2011 for Apple Macintosh to both 
form and trade the pairs. 
 
4   Methodology 
 
Implementing a Pairs trading strategy requires two stages of application. 
Firstly, pairs need to be formed. In this study, the formation period for pairs is a 6-
month period. For consistency in the length of the formation periods, this is equated 
to 125 trading days, which is marginally shorter than 6 months. The pairs then need to 
be traded, and each trading period was the 125 trading days following its relevant 
formation period. Thus, the trading of pairs was tested out of sample of pairs' 
formation. Each trading period lagged its formation period by 125 days and therefore 
the second formation period is over the same time frame as the first trading period. 
The periods are chosen to be similar to comparable to prior papers, most notably Do 
and Faff (2009) and Gatev et al. (2006). 
 
 
4.1  Pairs Formation 
 
The first step in the formation of pairs is to normalize the price series’ 
(inclusive of reinvested dividends) for each of the 80 shares over the corresponding 
125-day formation period. A stock’s normalized price is based on its expected price 
(in this case the average price over the period), the actual price and the standard 
deviation of the price over the period.  
 
Equation 1 𝑃∗!" = 𝑃!" − 𝐸(𝑃!")𝜎!  
 
Where: 
P * is the normalized price 
E(P) is the expected price, or the average price over the 125-day 
formation period 
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𝜎 is the standard deviation of the price over the 125-day period 
 
‘After the normalization, all shares are brought to the same standard unit and this 
permits a quantitatively fair formation of pairs’ Bolgun et al. (2009).  
 
After a normalized price series has been constructed for each of the 80 shares, 
the relationship of each stock to every other stock needs to be tested for the duration 
of the formation period. The closeness of the relationship between two shares is tested 
by a summation of the daily differences between the normalized price series’ of the 
shares. However, the sum of the differences would equate to zero. To ensure that real 
numbers are returned for accurate pair formation, the daily differences between the 
normalized price series’ are squared prior to their summation. This results in a 
measure called the Sum of the Squared Differences (SSD), which is calculated as 
follows: 
 
Equation 2  
𝑆𝑆𝐷 = (𝑃∗𝐴! − 𝑃∗𝐵!)!!"#!!!  
 
Where: 
P*A is the normalized price of Stock A 
P*B is the normalized price of Stock B 
 
A matrix of the Sum of the Squared Differences between the normalized price 
series’ was constructed for each formation period, and from that, a portfolio of 20 
pairs was created (the 20 pairs with the lowest SSD, which reflects the closest 
historical relationship between the shares’ prices). Within the portfolio of 20 pairs, 
two further portfolios were constructed – one using the 5 pairs with the lowest SSD 
and another using the 5 pairs with the highest SSD. A portion of the SSD matrix is 
available in the Appendix, the entire matrix is omitted due to its size and the limited 
amount of value it would add to this research report. 
This process of pair formation was repeated every 125 days to create the 
required portfolios of pairs for every 125-day trading period. On the 126th day, the 
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first trading period began using the portfolios selected in the first formation period, 
and concurrently, the second formation period began.  
Pairing was also carried out twice for every formation period, the first with no 
restriction (Unrestricted) on the paired shares and the second only allowing for pairs 
within the Resources (RESI) sector or within the Financials and Industrials (FINDI) 
sectors (Sector Restricted).  
The lack of any restrictions under the Unrestricted pairing is likely to result in 
a number of pairs that don’t make practical sense, such as a retailer and a property 
company. However, it is expected that, due to expected inter-Sector correlations, the 
majority of the pairs will still be from the same sector. 
 
Figure A.1: Formation Period 
 
 Initial formation period 
 
t0 t125 
1998/01/01 1998/06/24 
  Continuous formation period 
          2011/11/04 
 
4.2   Trading Period 
 
After the shares were paired in the formation period, portfolios of shares were 
constructed, and trading was simulated in the following 125-day trading period. This 
was done for both the unrestricted portfolio of pairs as well as the Sector Restricted 
portfolio of pairs.  
 Pairs from the matrix were ranked and the top 20 with the smallest SSD 
measure were used for the formation of 3 different portfolios. Firstly, a portfolio of all 
20 (Top20) pairs was tested. In addition a portfolio of the top 5 (Top5) as well as the 
pairs ranked between 15 and 20 (Bottom5) were tested. The portfolio construction 
differs from that of Do and Faff (2009) as well as Gatev et al. (2006) due to the 
smaller universe of shares (particularly those that are shortable, due to limited scrip 
borrow) on the JSE than on the S&P500.  
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 Trading of the pairs in the portfolios starts on the day following the last day of 
the corresponding formation period, and is carried out according to certain 
predetermined rules. When the spread between the prices of paired shares widens by 
more than a predetermined amount a position is opened. A long position is taken in 
the stock that has relatively decreased in price and a short position is taken in the 
stock that has relatively increased in price, assuming a reversion to the historic price 
relationship will occur. When, and if, the price relationship reverts, again to a 
predefined metric, the position is closed. Signals are generated based on the 125-day 
rolling standard deviation around a 125-day rolling mean of the shares’ normalized 
price relative.  
 In an attempt to be comparable to previous studies, the basic strategy of this 
study entails a spread of two standard deviations to open a position, and the 
subsequent reversion to a zero standard deviation spread generates the signal to close 
the pair. In addition to the basic trading rules, a number of other sets of trading rules 
have been tested to determine whether a particular set leads to relative 
outperformance.  
 The signal creation for trading pairs is generated by using the rolling 125-day 
average of the difference between the normalized prices of the paired shares, as well 
as the rolling 125-day standard deviation of the difference between the normalized 
prices of the paired shares. Using a 2 standard deviation opening signal, a pair is 
opened when a daily difference between two paired shares’ returns is greater than the 
rolling 125-day average plus two times the rolling 125-day standard deviation. 
 When a pair is opened, an equal position is taken in both the long and the short 
positions. For ease of interpretation in this study, a value of R1 is used for both the 
long and the short positions. Any positions that are open at the end of the trading 
period will be closed on that date and the corresponding profits or losses will be taken 
into account.  
 As no shares can delist during the trading period, as they were selected based 
on their market capitalizations at the end date, this can lead to a potential for 
survivorship bias. However, it must be noted that due to Pairs Trading deriving fifty 
percent of its returns from a long position (which would benefit from a higher portion 
of shares that previously performed well) as well as fifty percent of its returns from a 
short position (conversely, survivorship bias would have a negative effect on these 
returns), the effect of survivorship bias will be limited.  
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Figure A.2: Trading Period 
 Trading period 
t126    t251 
1998/06/25   1998/12/16 
 Continuous trading period 
         2012/04/26 
 
4.3  Excess Return Computation 
 
During the trading period, pairs can either; open and close once, open and 
close a number of times, never open or open and never close. Thus, calculating excess 
return is not an easy process. A pair that opens and converges has a positive cash flow 
(however, drastic movements in the stock prices can change both the rolling mean and 
rolling standard deviation, which could result in a pair that completes a round trip 
yielding a negative cash flow), while a pair that opens and hasn’t closed by the end of 
the period will have a cash flow on the last day of the period when it is closed out 
(this cash flow can be positive or negative depending on the relative performances of 
the shares). Due to the fact that a pair can open and close a number of times over the 
period, a pair can be made up of multiple cash flows. A Pairs trading strategy yields a 
number of randomly distributed cash flows over the trading period and a set of cash 
flows at the end of the final day that can be positive or negative due to positions being 
closed out.  
 The excess returns are calculated as the reinvested payoffs during the trading 
interval which is a, a conservative approach, assuming that cash earns a zero percent 
interest rate when not invested in an open pair, thus understating excess returns. The 
daily returns on the long and short positions (when they are marked-to-market) are 
calculated as follows; 
 
Equation 3 𝑟!,! =    𝑤!,!𝑟!,!!"# 𝑤!,!!"#  
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 Where wi,t is: 
 𝑤!,! =   𝑤!,!!! 1+ 𝑟!,!!! = 1+ 𝑟!,! … (1+ 𝑟!,!!!) 
 
 
 
With r defining returns and w defining weights. Monthly returns can be calculated by 
compounding daily returns.   
 
 As in the Do and Faff (2009) and Gatev et al. (2006) studies, two measures of 
excess return on a portfolio are analyzed, namely, return on Committed Capital and 
the Fully-Invested Return (return on employed capital). The first measure scales the 
portfolio’s performance by the number of pairs that are available to be traded (20 
pairs in each period), while the latter scales performance by the number of pairs that 
open during the period. The Return on Committed Capital is a more conservative 
approach of return calculation. If a pair doesn’t open for a trading period, the return 
for the period will be calculated as if a portion of funds was held in cash (on which no 
interest is earned). 
 
4.4  Performance Comparisons 
 
The performance of the Pairs trading strategy has been tested against a passive 
trading strategy. The passive strategy chosen is simply the daily return yielded by the 
ALSI, which was taken directly off INET BFA.  
Comparisons were made on a cumulative returns basis for the period 
2002/06/11 until 2012/04/26. Comparisons were also drawn between the daily returns 
of the strategies, which allows for a comparison of the volatility of returns yielded by 
the different strategies.  
In addition, return comparisons were conducted over 4 sub periods of equal 
length, being 875 trading days or roughly 3,5 years. Each sub period spanned 7 
trading periods. This was in order to test whether the performance of Pairs trading has 
changed over time. 
 
4.5  Scrip Borrow and Fees 
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Due to the high frequency of trading expected under a quantitative strategy, it 
is important to examine the after-fee returns, particularly in comparison to a passive 
strategy of holding an index. 
To this degree, a trading (brokerage) fee of 10 basis points (bips) was used per 
trade. Fees of this size could realistically be expected to be incurred by large 
institutional investors, while individuals would be likely to incur comparably higher 
trading costs.  
As a caveat to this research report, the costs of scrip lending have not been 
included. This is due to the vast differences in both the availability and cost of 
borrowing scrip between different shares on the JSE. For example, a number of 
particularly large counters in the Top40 have no available (or prohibitively expensive) 
scrip available due to being tightly held, while a number of smaller counters have 
comparably readily available cheap scrip on offer. The unpredictable nature of scrip 
on the Top40 is even more pronounced when extended to the Top80 universe. 
Furthermore, the potential costs associated with a short recall have not been 
taken into account in this study. A short recall occurs when the lender of scrip 
requires that the borrower returns borrowed scrip any time prior to when they were 
aiming to. This forces the borrower to purchase the stock back in the market, 
potentially at unfavourable rates. Furthermore, the investor would be forced to close 
an open pair prematurely should he be unable to locate alternative scrip.  
The lack of available scrip on the JSE could potentially be a limiting factor on 
the ability of an investor to trade a Pairs trading strategy in practice. Should scrip be 
unavailable in the counter that an investor wishes to short, under a Pairs trading 
strategy, the investor could not take a long position in the paired counter. 
 
4.6  Sharpe Ratios 
 
The formula for calculating a Sharpe Ratio is as follows; 
 𝑆𝑅 =   𝑅! − 𝑅!𝜎  
Where; 
SR is the Sharpe Ratio 
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𝑅! is the return on the portfolio 𝑅! is the risk free rate 
 𝜎 is the standard deviation of the strategy 
 
 However, due to each pair being self-funded (the short sale funds the long 
purchase every time a pair is opened), funds committed to the strategy can earn the 
risk free rate. Thus, the following equation holds true; 
 𝑅! = 𝑅!" + 𝑅! 
 Where; 
  𝑅!" is the Return of the Long/Short postition 
 
 Therefore, the Sharpe Ratio is calculated as follows in this research report; 
 𝑆𝑅 =   𝑅!"𝜎  
 
 However, a caveat to this section is that the committed funds may not quite 
earn the risk free rate. This is due to the associated trading costs, particularly scrip 
borrow costs, which would be required to be paid on the strategy eroding the 
committed capital. 
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5  Empirical Results 
5.1  Strategy Profits 
 
5.1.1  Unrestricted 
5.1.1.1 Unrestricted (2;0) 
 
 
Gatev et al. (2006) as well as Do and Faff (2009) both tested a Pairs trading 
strategy using a 2 standard deviation spread to open a position and a subsequent 0 
standard deviation spread to close the position. It is because these studies are both so 
widely respected and cited that this study employs their basic set of trading rules i.e. 2 
and 0 standard deviation trade execution triggers. 
 
 
Table 1.1 – Returns Analysis – Unrestricted (2;0)  
Where: 
R = Return SD = Standard Deviation SR = Sharpe Ratio RPT = Return Per Trade 
ASSD = Average Sum of Squared Distances  ANOP = Average Number of Open Pairs 
MR = Monthly Return NoT = Number of Trades ATL = Average Trade Length 
(A more detailed explanation is available in the Appendix) 
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Initially a 20 pair portfolio, constructed with the closest fitting 20 pairs, was 
tested using the basic trading rules of a 2 and 0 standard deviation spread. The before 
fee results are summarized in Table 1.1.  
 
The annualized return for each 125 day trading period was, on average, 
63,69% before trading costs were taken into account, and no period had an annualized 
before-fee return of less than 24,10%. All returns had a significant t-stat at the 2% 
level and, notably, 27 of the 29 sub periods were statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The average trading period before-fee standard deviation was 0,08, which 
reflects the low risk nature of the trading strategy. Sharpe Ratio’s have been 
calculated in excess of cash due to the particularly low risk nature of the strategy, as 
well as the equal long and short positions entered into under each pair, and were high 
across all 29 sub-periods. Returns before trading costs were clearly both statistically 
as well as economically significant. However, as with many quantitative trading 
strategies, profits may not have been resilient to the high level of trading costs 
incurred. 
The average number of open pairs was generally fairly close to 10 (8,74 pairs), 
such that at any point in time roughly fifty percent of the funds allocated to the 
strategy were invested. If only fifty percent of the portfolio is invested, the remaining 
fifty percent would remain in cash (so as to remain immediately investible, should an 
open signal be triggered) and not yield a return. On average, the portfolio would be 
under-invested. The low average level of investment was driven both by the high 
number of trades (142), as well as low average trade length (7,88 days). The high 
number of trades executed is a result of 2 trades being executed simultaneously every 
time a position opens and closes, 1 long and another short. Thus, for every round trip 
(open and close) that a pair completes, 4 trades in total are required to be executed. 
The Return Per Trade (which averaged 20 bips, and ranged from 10 to 51 bips) is 
essentially the maximum possible transaction costs that the strategy would have been 
able to endure before the high frequency of trading diminished positive returns. 
Therefore the basic strategy would have been resilient to low levels of brokerage costs 
(such as the costs an institutional investor would enjoy) in the majority of the trading 
periods. Should an investor be able to open (and close) a pair (funding both the long 
and the short trade) at less then 40 bips (20 bips for each trade), the strategy on 
average would have yielded after-fee positive returns. Conversely, should the investor 
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be unable to trade for under 40 bips, on average a negative after-fee return would 
have been yielded. These breakeven costs are inclusive of both brokerage as well as 
scrip lending. It is expected that an institutional investor should be able to yield 
profitable returns from Pairs trading (particularly if scrip borrow is excluded), while 
an individual investor could have his positive before-fee returns more than eroded by 
trading costs. 
 
 
Table 1.2 - After-fee Analysis – Unrestricted (2;0)  
 
Table 1.2 highlights the after-fee (brokerage) return that an institutional 
investor would have yielded. Notably Table 1.2 presents an after-fee return analysis, 
relating only to institutional investors. This is because Pairs trading is a strategy that 
is more likely to be employed by an institutional investor, and institutional fees don’t 
tend to vary as substantially, nor be as large, as the fees incurred by an individual 
investor.  
The assumption of a fee in the region of 10 bips (for brokerage) per trade is 
both realistic and conservative in terms of the transaction costs institutional investors 
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can expect to pay when trading on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). The after 
fee returns were calculated by taking the 125 day return in each period and 
subtracting 0,1% (10 bips) multiplied by the number of trades (which are weighted to 
reflect their portion of the portfolio weight – multiplied by 5%, for both the long and 
the short trade required to open and close a pair) executed in the period. The results 
show that positive after-fee returns were yielded in every trading period. After-fee 
returns ranged between 0% (0% annualized) and 54,21% (137,80% annualized). The 
resultant after-fee Sharpe Ratio’s of the strategy ranged between 0 and 7.64, and 
averaged 3.16.  
The average 125-day after-fee return for the strategy over the 29 Trading 
Periods was 13,26% (29,47% annualized), a substantial figure. A number of the more 
substantial returns occurred earlier in the period of study, with 4 of the last 5 periods 
yielding sub 3% after-fee 125-day returns.  
 
 
Figure 1 – Before- and After-fee Returns – Unrestricted (2;0)  
 
Figure 1 graphs the before- and after-fee returns yielded by the (2;0) trading 
strategy. Clearly, with the exception of the period beginning in the middle of 2007 
and ending in the middle of 2009 (a period highlighted by substantial market stress 
and elevated levels of market volatility), before- and after-fee returns yielded by Pairs 
Trading were (as Gatev et al. (2006) and Do and Faff (2009) concluded) on a 
downward trend. The strategy yielded higher than normal returns in both periods of 
in-sample market stress – namely, 1998 as well as the previously mentioned period. 
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The reason underlying these findings is the market neutral nature of the trading 
strategy benefiting from the substantially increased market volatility. Increased 
market volatility is expected to both increase the number of pairs that trade, as well as 
increase the return per trade. Increased market volatility is likely to result in larger 
standard deviations as well as means of the SSD’s of paired shares. Therefore a larger 
relative share price move (an increase of the long position, and/or a decrease in the 
short position) of the paired shares is required to trigger a close signal, which would 
result in larger returns.  
 
 
Table 1.3 – Top20 Portfolio Risk and Return Drivers – Unrestricted (2;0) 
 
Table 1.3 highlights the breakdown of those pairs in the Top20 portfolio 
(Table 1.1) that contributed towards the overall portfolio performance. For the 
purposes of analysis, the Top20 portfolio is included, together with another portfolio 
constructed of only the 5 pairs in the portfolio with the smallest sum of the squared 
distances between their normalized prices (Top5). A third portfolio is also included 
(Bottom5), which includes the five pairs in the Top20 portfolio that have the largest 
sum of their normalized squared differences. The Top5 portfolio consists of the pairs 
with the closest observed price relationships, while the Bottom5 portfolio consists of 
the 5 pairs that have shown the weakest observed price relationships in the Top20 
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portfolio. The returns yielded by all three of the portfolios were calculated through the 
Return on Committed Capital (the more conservative return metric) approach. 
 
 
Table 1.4 – Profitability Analysis – Unrestricted (2;0) 
 
The Top20 portfolio realized the highest average annualized before-fee return 
of 63,69%, compared to 57,28% and 60,24% for the Top5 and Bottom5 portfolios 
respectively. Furthermore, the Top20 portfolio yielded the highest returns in 11 of the 
29 sub periods and the lowest return in only 1. The Bottom5 portfolio, on average, 
yielded a 2,96% higher return than the Top5 portfolio. As expected, increasing the 
number of pairs in a portfolio from 5 to 20 contributed diversification benefits, which 
was evident in the substantially lower standard deviation of the Top20 portfolio 
(when compared to the Top5 or Bottom5 portfolios). The standard deviation of the 
Top20 portfolio was on average 0.08, while the 5 pair portfolios were both 
substantially higher, at 0.13. The higher return and lower risk associated with the 
Top20 portfolio led to a substantially larger Sharpe Ratio then both of the 5 pair 
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portfolios. The T-statistics for the Top20 portfolio were all significant at the 2% level, 
and 27 out of the 29 sub periods were significant at the 1% level. The T-Statistics for 
both the Top5 and Bottom5 portfolios were significant at the 5% level in the majority 
of the trading periods, with insignificant t-stats in 5 and 4 sub periods respectively. 
 
Table 1.4 comprises of a returns analysis of the Top20 portfolio, and 
illustrates that opening pairs at a 2 standard deviation spread resulted in almost every 
of the 20 pairs opening in every trading period. This was however, with the exception 
of 4 sub periods – all of which occurred post 2007, and in which only 19 out of 20 
pairs opened. A decrease in the number of traded pairs in the later periods could be a 
driving force behind the declining returns yielded by Pairs trading, as concluded by 
Gatev et al. (2006), Do and Faff (2009). All 20 pairs opening in a period will lead to a 
larger number of trades being executed than if fewer of the pairs were to open. A 
large number of trades, assuming re-convergence for the majority, will boost before-
fee returns.  Of note, an increased number of trades will also serve to increase the net 
trading costs incurred. 
 
The difference between the Return on Committed Capital and the Fully 
Invested Return in this instance was negligible. This is due to all 20 of the pairs 
having opened in the majority of the sub periods. Where 20 pairs didn’t open, 19 pairs 
still traded. 
 
The second half of Table 1.4 represents a break- down of the profitability of 
the Top20 portfolio. The majority of pairs selected were profitable before trading 
costs and an average of only 3,45% of pairs yielded a negative before-fee return in 
each sub period. This figure indicates that, on average, less than 1 pair yielded 
negative before-fee returns per sub period. A figure of 5% would highlight a negative 
pair per trading period. No sub periods had more than 15% (3 pairs) of the pairs 
yielding a negative return. It must be noted that these return metrics are gross of 
trading costs, and therefore a larger number of pairs could potentially have yielded 
negative net of fee returns (however, the frequency of positive 125-day after-fee 
returns suggests that this wasn’t the case). Daily before-fee returns were more often 
than not positive for every sub period, and ranged from 20,8% to 40,8% of days 
yielding negative returns, with an average of 30,23%. In all but 3 sub periods, the 
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absolute value of the maximum daily return was larger than the absolute value of the 
minimum daily return. The average maximum daily return was 2,13%, while the 
average minimum daily return was -1,18%. Again, the daily profitability analysis is 
gross of fees. 
 
It appears that the Top20 portfolio (using 2 and 0 standard deviation trading 
signals) yielded positive before-fee returns more frequently than not, both in terms of 
days as well as pairs. Significantly, also, positive returns tended to be larger than 
negative returns. Of further significance, Pairs trading, using the (2;0) set of trading 
parameters, appears to have been resilient to a conservative measure of trading costs 
(broking costs, but still being gross of scrip borrowing costs) that an institutional 
investor could expect to pay. However, it must be noted that both before- and after-
fee returns appear to be on a downward trend, a finding that has been noted in a 
number of prior papers including Gatev et al. (2006) and Do and Faff (2009).  
 While the basic (2;0) strategy appears to produce positive outperformance on 
the JSE, there is potential scope for further improvements to be yielded from different 
trading parameters, as well as sector restrictions.  
 
5.1.1.2  Unrestricted (2;-0.5) 
  
 A second set of trading rules was imposed on the Unrestricted pairs sample, 
namely, opening a position at a 2 standard deviation spread and closing the position 
only when the pairs had crossed by a further half standard deviation (a subsequent 
half standard deviation spread from the mean in the opposite direction to the opening 
signal).  
 The theoretical rationale underlying this strategy is that the longer holding 
period (in terms of a required relative price shift required to trigger the closing signal) 
will serve to increase the return generated per round trip completed, when compared 
to the basic (2;0) set of trading parameters. The (2;-0,5) trading strategy requires a 2,5 
standard deviation relative move in the paired shares prices, while the (2;0) strategy 
only required a 2 standard deviation move. In addition, the longer holding period is 
expected to decrease the number of trades that are executed. This is due to the fact 
that should a pair open (at a 2 standard deviation spread), return to a 0 standard 
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deviation spread, and then subsequently to a 2 standard deviation spread, the pair will 
only open once under the (2;-0,5) set of trading parameters. The same pair would 
open twice under the (2;0) set of trading parameters. This will have the effect of 
reducing the number of sources of return generation of the strategy, which will cause 
a drag on performance. However, it will also serve to decrease the net trading costs of 
the strategy. Therefore, changing the trading parameters could serve to increase the 
returns generated (resulting in outperformance) as a result of more significant returns 
per round trip completed, coupled with a decreased net trading cost. However, the 
reduced number of trades executed could serve to decrease the yielded returns to a 
larger degree than the increased return per trade bolsters them.  
 
 Table 2.1 summarizes the results of the Top20 portfolio when traded 
according to the (2;-0,5) set of trading parameters. The average annualized before-fee 
return was substantially higher when compared to the (2;0) strategy, at 70,54% 
(compared to 63,69%) and, notably, the annualized before-fee returns were higher in 
all but 2 of the 29 sub periods. The lowest before-fee trading period return was 
23,62%, marginally lower than the 24,10% minimum trading period return that the 
basic (2;0) strategy yielded. As observed under the basic strategy, all t-statistics were 
significant at the 2% level, and 27 out of the 29 sub periods were significant at the 1% 
level. The associated standard deviation of the strategy (0,09) was marginally higher 
than that of the basic strategy (0,08). A standard deviation of 0,09 reflects a notably 
un-volatile (low risk) set of returns. Following the reasoning used with the basic 
strategy, Sharpe Ratios were calculated above cash and were, moreover, all 
substantial. Again, before-fee returns were significant in both a statistical as well as 
an economic sense in all 29 Trading Periods.  
The basic (2;0) strategy proved to be resilient to conservative brokerage costs 
(for institutional investors) in all 29 Trading Periods. Higher before-fee returns, 
coupled with an expected lower number of trades, leads to the expectation of positive 
after-fee returns that could be yielded by an institutional investor.  
 
 The average trade length (10,31 days) was, as expected, longer than that of the 
basic strategy (7,88 days). It stands to reason that an open pair will be held for a 
longer period, when compared to the (2;0) strategy, due to the greater relative price 
change that is required to trigger the close signal. The increased trade length led to a 
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larger average number of open pairs, 10.63 pairs relative to 8.74 pairs. On average, 
marginally more than 50% of the allocated funds would have been invested at any 
point. Despite a slight improvement when compared to the basic strategy, the strategy 
was still substantially under-invested.  
As expected, there were fewer trades in all 29 sub-periods. The average 
number of trades declined by 7% (i.e. from 142 to 132). Increased returns as well as a 
decrease in the number of trades executed, resulted in a higher average before-fee 
return per trade of 0,23% (the minimum return per trade was 0,11% in a single period) 
when compared to 0,20%. Therefore, it is still expected that, on average, an 
institutional investor would yield positive after-fee returns. An individual investor is 
still expected to have their before-fee return more than eroded by trading costs, 
particularly when scrip borrow costs are included.  
 
 
Table 2.1 – Returns Analysis – Unrestricted (2;-0,5) 
 
Table 2.2 presents a breakdown of the after-fee returns that an institutional 
investor would have earned. (Again, a brokerage cost per portfolio turnover of 10 bips 
has been employed and individual investors have been excluded.)  
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All 29 of the sub-periods can be seen to have yielded positive after-fee returns 
(125-day after-fee returns ranged from 1,38% to 61,36%), and the average after-fee 
return was 16,80% (37,88% annualized). Significantly, the (2;-0,5) strategy 
outperformed the (2;0) trading strategy with regard to after-fee returns in 28 out of the 
29 sub periods. The average trading period after-fee return was 16,80% (37,88% 
annualized), a substantial increase from the after-fee return of 13,26% (29,47% 
annualized) yielded by the (2;0) strategy. The returns were again realized at a low 
level of risk, resulting in an average after-fee Sharpe Ratio of 3.88, higher than the 
after-fee Sharpe Ratio (3.16) yielded by the (2;0) strategy. 
 
 
Table 2.2 – After-fee Analysis – Unrestricted (2;-0,5) 
 
The payoff trend, highlighted in Figure 2 is clearly an upward shift of the 
basic trading strategy’s payoff trend. Pertinently, as can be observed, the trend of both 
strategies’ before- and after-fee returns is downward. This, again, excludes the period 
of market stress (beginning mid 2007 and ending mid 2009).  
 
 48 
The descriptive data highlighted in Table 2.3 can be compared to that in Table 
1.3. Both of these represent breakdowns of which of the 5 pair portfolios (Top5 and 
Bottom5), within the Top20 portfolio, contributed most towards risk and returns. Like 
observed under the basic strategy, the average before fee return yielded by the Top20 
portfolio was highest, at 70,54%, compared to 65,87% and 65,60% for the Top5 and 
Bottom5 portfolios respectively. All three (2;-0,5) portfolios yielded higher before-fee 
returns when compared to the best performing (Top20) portfolio for the basic (2;0) 
trading rule (63,69%). The associated standard deviations for all three portfolios were 
marginally higher than their comparative standard deviations under the basic strategy. 
Diversification benefits of a 20 pair portfolio, in comparison to a 5 pair portfolio, 
were still evident. The standard deviations were 0.09, 0.14 and 0.14 for the Top20, 
Top5 and Bottom5 portfolios respectively – compared with 0.08, 0.13 and 0.13 for the 
basic strategy portfolios. T-statistics for the returns of the Top20 portfolio were all 
significant at the 2% level, with 27 out of the 29 sub-periods having been significant 
at the 1% level. The Top5 and Bottom5 portfolios were significant at the 5% level in 
the majority of the sub-periods, with the exception of 4 and 5 periods respectively 
(which were statistically insignificant). As would be expected, the Top20 portfolio 
Sharpe Ratio’s were substantially larger than those of the 5 pair portfolios. This was a 
result of the higher returns coupled with the lower associated standard deviations. 
 
 
 Figure 2 – Before- and After-fee Returns – Unrestricted (2;-0,5) 
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The number of pairs that opened in each trading period for the (2;-0,5) 
strategy was equal to that of the basic strategy, as is shown in Table 2.4. This was 
expected due to the same opening parameter resulting in the same pairs opening under 
both strategies. It must be noted that this is not the number of trades that were 
executed (a figure that is lower than that of the basic strategy), but merely a reflection 
on how many of the 20 pairs did, or didn’t, trade during a specific period. Again, the 
difference between the Return on Committed Capital and the Fully Invested Return 
was negligible.  
 
 
Table 2.3 – Top20 Portfolio Risk and Return Drivers – Unrestricted (2;-0,5) 
 
The second half of Table 2.4 also illustrates the returns analysis of the trading 
strategy. The percentage of pairs that yielded negative before-fee trading costs was 
slightly lower, averaging 3.10%, compared to 3.45% under the basic strategy. 
However, the (2;-0,5) strategy included trading periods that had a larger number of 
pairs yielding negative before-fee returns when compared to that of the basic trading 
strategy. The maximum number of pairs yielding a negative return in a trading period 
increased from 15% (3 pairs) to 20% (4 pairs). As previously noted with respect to the 
basic strategy, daily before-fee portfolio returns were more often than not positive. 
Negative daily returns ranged from 22,4% to 38,4% of days (in each individual 
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trading period). The average percentage of negative trading days was marginally 
higher than the (2,0) strategy at 30.51% (30,23%). In all but one of the trading periods, 
the absolute value of the maximum daily portfolio return was larger then the absolute 
value of the portfolio daily minimum return. The average maximum daily return was 
2,20% and the minimum average daily return was -1,20%. All of these statistics 
highlight the marginally increased volatility of the (2;-0,5) strategy, in comparison to 
the (2;0) trading strategy. 
As with the (2,0) strategy, before-fee returns were more often than not positive, 
both in terms of pairs as well as days, and, moreover, positive returns tended to be 
more significant than the negative returns. 
 
 
Table 2.4 – Profitability Analysis – Unrestricted (2;-0,5) 
 
Evidently, changing the closing parameter from 0 standard deviations to -0,5 
standard deviations served to improve before- and after-fee returns, while marginally 
increasing the associated levels of risk (as evidenced by higher standard deviations). 
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Significantly, despite the increased standard deviations, the (2;-0,5) strategy 
outperformed the (2;0) strategy in terms of risk adjusted returns, as measured by the 
larger Sharpe Ratio.  
Of further significance is the persistence of the observation of declining 
before- and after-fee returns, again, with the exception of the period of increased 
market stress and in-line with prior research. 
 
5.1.1.3  Unrestricted (3;-0.5) 
 
In addition to the (2;0) and (2;-0,5) sets of trading rules, a third set of trading 
parameters was tested on the Unrestricted sample. The signal to open a position was 
generated at a 3 standard deviation spread, and the close signal was generated when 
the spread reverted to a 0,5 standard deviation spread in the opposite direction – the 
(3;-0.5) strategy. 
The theoretical rationale behind testing the (3;-0,5) strategy is along a similar 
vein to that of the (2;-0,5) strategy. Firstly, due to the improved results that arose from 
shifting the closing parameter to -0,5 standard deviations, that closing parameter is 
retained. In addition, having noted relative out-performance, (as previously 
hypothesized) due to a longer holding spread, the opening parameter was shifted to 3 
standard deviations. The required relative move of the prices to close an open pair 
under the (3;-0,5) strategy is 3,5 historical standard deviations, substantially larger 
than the 2 and 2,5 standard deviation relative moves required under the (2;0) and (2;-
0,5) strategies respectively. The (3;-0,5) strategy is hypothesized to further reduce the 
number of trades executed, as well as increase the returns generated by each round 
trip that a pair completed.  
An opening parameter of 3 standard deviations is expected to substantially 
reduce the number of pairs that open, a larger opening parameter requires a greater 
movement in the relative prices before an open signal is generated. The basic 
theoretical rationale behind Pairs trading is that the paired shares exhibited a stable 
historical price relationship. A 3 standard deviation spread in the relative prices of the 
paired shares is therefore less likely than a 2 standard deviation spread. This led to the 
hypothesis that a lower number of 20 pairs would be likely to open in the average 
trading period, which would serve to drastically decrease the number of trades that 
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would be required to be executed. In addition, a longer holding period increases the 
probability of a pair having not closed when it returns to a 3 standard deviation spread, 
and thus further decreasing the number of executed trades. It must be noted that, as 
for the (2;-0,5) strategy, despite the increased return per completed round trip coupled 
with expected decreased trading costs, relative underperformance could occur. This 
relative underperformance could be expected, should the number of trades be 
substantially decreased, resulting in too few sources of return generation. 
 
 
Table 3.1 – Returns Analysis – Unrestricted (3;-0,5) 
 
A summary of the Top20 portfolio’s before-fee returns, when traded according 
to the (3;-0.5) trading parameters, is presented in Table 3.1. The before-fee returns 
were lower than those of both the (2;0) and (2;-0.5) strategies in all of the 29 periods. 
The average annualized before-fee return was 42,19% and ranged between 13,80% 
and 82,73%, which is substantially lower than the 63,69% and 70,54% yielded under 
the (2;0) and (2;-0.5) strategies respectively. With the exception of one sub period 
(which was only significant at the 10% level), all returns were statistically significant 
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at the 1% level. In addition to the lower returns, the strategy also had a substantially 
lower average level of risk (as evidenced by a standard deviation of 0,06) than both of 
the other strategies (0,08 and 0,09 under the (2;0) and (2;-0,5) strategies respectively). 
Despite the lower standard deviations, the substantially reduced returns led to an 
average before-fee Sharpe Ratio (6,73) that lagged both the (2;0) (7,84) and (2;-0.5) 
(7,99) strategies. The substantially reduced returns, however, remained significant in 
both an economic as well as a statistical sense.  
 
 
Table 3.3 – Top 20 Portfolio Risk and Return Drivers – Unrestricted (3;-0,5) 
 
As hypothesized, the average trade length of the (3;-0,5) strategy was longer 
when compared to the two strategies that have been previously tested. Once a pair 
opened, there was a larger relative movement required to trigger the close signal. The 
average trade length was 10,56 days, an increase from 7,88 days and 10,31 days under 
the (2;0) and (2;-0.5) strategies respectively. The comparatively similar average trade 
length when compared to the (2;-0,5) strategy, despite the substantially larger price 
movement required to trigger the close signal, suggests that the larger degree to which 
a pair deviates from its historical relationship the quicker it is likely to converge. 
Furthermore, as hypothesized, the average number of open pairs was significantly 
lower, averaging only 5.13, compared to 8.74 and 10.63 for the comparable strategies. 
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Only 25,65% of funds allocated to the Pairs trading portfolio were likely to have been 
invested at any point, thus, the (3;-0,5) strategy was substantially under-invested. A 
potential topic for further research is whether or not it would be feasible to apply 
leverage to any of the substantially under-invested strategies tested in this study.  
 
As hypothesized, the number of executed trades was substantially lower, and 
averaged only 62 trades per period. A figure that is less than 50% of the 142 and 132 
trades averaged under both the (2;0) and (2;-0.5) strategies. Based on the substantially 
reduced number of executed trades, the before-fee Return per Trade increased to 
0.31%, compared to 0.20% and 0.23% under the (2;0) and (2;-0,5) strategies.  
 
Table 3.3 decomposes the Top20 portfolio to determine which pairs within it 
contributed most towards the strategy’s risk and return. In stark contrast with both 
previously tested strategies, the Top5 portfolio generated the highest before-fee 
returns (42,69%), with the Top20 portfolio (42,19%) ranking second and the Bottom5 
portfolio (40,02%) having yielding the lowest of the returns. A possible explanation 
for this observation is that when paired shares diverge by such a large degree, a closer 
historical relationship is more likely to drive future convergence, or convergence at a 
more rapid rate. All 3 portfolios underperformed (before-fees) all 6 of the portfolios 
tested under both the (2;0) and (2;-0.5) sets of trading rules.  
Diversification benefits were once again apparent, with the Top20 portfolio’s 
(0.06) standard deviation substantially lower than that of the Top5 (0.11) and 
Bottom5 (0.10) portfolios. These standard deviations were lower than their 
comparable portfolios under the other strategies, in line with the lower the before-fee 
returns. However, due to the diversification benefits of a 20 pair portfolio, when 
compared to the 5 pair portfolios, the Top20 portfolio for both the (2;0) and (2;-0,5) 
strategies yielded a lower standard deviation than either of the (3;-0,5) 5 pair 
portfolios. 
 
The Top20 portfolio before-fee returns were significant at the 1% level in 28 
of the 29 sub periods, and significant at the 10% level in the remaining period. The 5 
pair portfolios didn’t fare as well, significantly, as the Top20 portfolios or the 
comparable 5 pair portfolios tested in the other strategies. The Top5 portfolio was 
insignificant (above the 10% level) in 6 of the 29 sub periods and only 15 of the 
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periods were significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, the Bottom5 portfolio had only 
three insignificant periods, but only 11 periods were significant at the 1% level. 
Before-fee returns yielded by the (3;-0,5) strategy were considerably less significant 
than for the comparative portfolios under the (2;0) and (2;-0,5) strategies.  
The before-fee Sharpe Ratios of all three portfolios were lower than their 
respective portfolios under the other strategies, due to their lower returns, and in spite 
of their lower associated standard deviations. Once again, the Top20 (6.73) portfolio 
had a higher Sharpe Ratio than both the Top5 (3.89) and Bottom5 (3,74) portfolios 
due to the diversification benefits yielding a substantially lower standard deviation.  
 
 
Table 3.2 – After-fee Returns – Unrestricted (3;-0,5) 
 
After-fee (scrip borrowing costs excluded) returns are presented in Table 3.2 
and again, only for an institutional investor (10 bips per trade). Positive after-fee 
returns were realized in all 29 sub periods tested, and averaged 12,84% (27,84% 
annualized). After-fee returns ranged from 3,25% to 29,04%. This return is 
substantially lower than both the 13,26% (29,47% annualized) and 16,80% (37,88% 
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annualized) after-fee returns of the (2;0) and (2;-0.5) strategies respectively. However, 
the return of 12,84% had a lower associated standard deviation, and the after-fee 
Sharpe Ratio (4.20) was larger then that of both the (2;0) (3.16) and (2;-0,5) (3.88) 
strategies.  
Figure 3 highlights the payoff trend, as well as the number of pairs that 
opened in a particular period. Again, the clear downward trend in returns that was 
evident under both the (2;0) and (2;-0,5) strategies is clear under the (3;-0,5) strategy 
(again, with the exceptions of the period of pronounced market stress). However, the 
payoff pattern was substantially more volatile than for comparative strategies. 
Significantly, the figure illustrates that returns and the number of pairs that open in a 
period appear to be positively correlated. This affirms the earlier hypothesis that 
fewer pairs opening in a period leads to fewer sources of returns, and therefore lower 
overall returns. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Before- and After-fee Returns – Unrestricted (3;-0,5) 
 
Table 3.4 highlights that substantially fewer pairs traded under the (3;-0.5) 
strategy. This is as a result of a larger relative price move being required to trigger the 
opening of a position. There is less likelihood of a pair moving to a 3 standard 
deviation spread than there is of a pair moving to a 2 standard deviation spread. Any 
pair that opens for the (3;-0,5) strategy will, by definition, have to have opened under 
the (2;0) and (2;-0,5) strategies as the spread will have to breach the 2 standard 
deviation open signal to reach the 3 standard deviation open signal. 
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An average of 17.28 (86.4%) of the 20 pairs opened per period, compared to 
19.86 (99,3%) under both of the other strategies, with individual periods dropping as 
low as only having had 13 of the 20 pairs open (compared to a previous low of 19). 
The decreased number of pairs that traded in the periods led to a discrepancy between 
the Return on Committed Capital and the Fully Invested Return, with before-fee 
returns of 42,19% and 48,73% on average respectively. However, using a Fully 
Invested Return measure is unrealistic, due to a potential requirement to breach a 
fund’s risk limits in order to invest an overly large portion of the fund in a reduced 
number of pairs. Essentially, if only 1 pair was to open, a Fully Invested Return 
would require that 100% of the funds allocated to the strategy to be invested in that 
particular pair. An investor would be highly unlikely to be willing to take on the 
substantially higher risk of investing the entire sum of allocated capital in only one 
pair. Being fully invested would mean that, should an open signal on a closed pair be 
triggered, a portion of the pairs currently being held would need to be liquidated 
(potentially at unfavorable valuations should the shares have continued to diverge) in 
order to open the new pair, this would involve unnecessary trading costs (which are 
already particularly high in a number of strategies). It must, however, be noted that 
due to the lower average number of open positions, the full amount of capital 
allocated to the trading strategy need not to have been held. Improved performance 
could potentially be achieved by investing a slightly larger portion (greater than 5% 
per pair in a 20 pair portfolio) of the allocated funds in each of the open pairs. In 
addition, the investment horizon could potentially be slightly increased (more then 20 
pairs included in the portfolio, while keeping a maximum investment of 5% per pair). 
Both of these potential areas of improvement are out of the scope of this study, and 
are potential topics for future research.  
 
An analysis of the strategy returns is laid out in the second half of Table 3.4. 
The number of unprofitable pairs, on average, was less than half of either of the 
previously tested strategies; only 1.21% of pairs, compared to 3.45% and 3.10% 
under the (2;0) and (2;-0,5) strategies respectively. The maximum unprofitable pairs 
in a period based on the (3;-0.5) strategy was 10% (2 pairs), compared to 15% (3 
pairs) and 20% (4 pairs) of pairs for the (2;0) and (2;-0.5) strategies respectively. It 
appears that a stronger opening signal (of 3 standard deviations as opposed to 2) 
increased the probability of the individual pairs’ before-fee returns being positive. 
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This makes intuitive sense based on the assumption that the formed pairs have a 
relative pricing relationship (and the positive before-fee returns thus far suggest so), a 
larger spread would be more likely to drive convergence more rapidly, due to a larger 
breakdown in the equilibrium price relationship. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, 
the wider spread of 3 standard deviations will yield a larger return per round trip than 
an opening position of 2 standard deviations. Pairs converging to a rolling mean and 
using a rolling standard deviation make it plausible that a round trip could potentially 
yield a slightly negative return. This could occur should there be a drastic change in 
either (or both of) the rolling mean or standard deviation. A larger opening relative 
price differential is less likely to result in a negative return yielded by a round trip, as 
the rolling measures will need to change by a larger degree to result in negative 
returns. 
 
As expected, based on the observations of other strategies, daily returns were 
more often than not positive. The percentage of negative daily returns ranged between 
23.2% and 38.4% of days, and averaged 30.73%. This was marginally higher than the 
30,23% and 30,51% of negative days under the (2;0) and (2;-0,5) strategies 
respectively. While the deterioration in the number of positive trading days was not 
statistically significant, it could be expected. A substantially lower average number of 
open pairs results in each pair having a larger impact on the portfolio’s return. One 
pair yielding a substantial negative daily return is more likely to result in a negative 
portfolio return should there only be 5, as opposed to 13, open pairs. In 27 of the 29 
sub periods the absolute value of the maximum daily return was larger than the 
absolute value of the minimum daily return, averaging 1.71% and -0.93% respectively. 
Once again, positive before-fee returns were both larger and more frequent (both in 
terms of days as well as pairs) than negative returns. 
 
As observed under both the (2;0) and (2;-0,5) strategies, the returns yielded by 
the (3;-0,5) strategy appear to be on a downward trend with the exception of periods 
of increased market volatility. 
 
Increasing the opening parameter to 3 standard deviations served to decrease 
both the before- and after-fee returns yielded by Pairs trading, when compared to 
strategies using a 2 standard deviation opening spread. However, the lower returns 
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appear to have been yielded at a lower level of risk, as evidenced by a lower standard 
deviation. Significantly, while the (3;-0,5) strategy underperformed strategies with a 2 
standard deviation opening parameter with regards to before-fee Sharpe Ratios, it 
outperformed them on an after-fee Sharpe Ratio metric. However, due to Pairs trading 
being a relatively low risk strategy, an investor would be likely to prefer taking on 
marginally more risk under one of the trading strategies with a 2 standard deviation 
opening parameter in order to potentially yield larger returns.  
 
 
Table 3.4 – Profitability Analysis – Unrestricted (3;-0,5) 
 
5.1.1.4  Unrestricted (2;-1) 
  
 Changing the closing parameter from 0 standard deviations to -0,5 standard 
deviations served to improve before- and after-fee returns (it did, however, also 
increase the associated standard deviation and therefore risk) for an opening 
parameter of 2 standard deviations. Thus far strategies with an opening parameter of 2 
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standard deviations have outperformed (before- and after-fees) a strategy with an 
opening parameter of 3 standard deviations in terms of returns, while outperforming 
(underperforming) in terms of before-fee (after-fee) Sharpe Ratios. The reason for this 
was the fact that the increased opening parameters served to substantially decrease the 
number of trades, and therefore the sources of return generation (and fees). Changing 
the closing parameter to -1 standard deviation is expected to simultaneously further 
increase the return per round trip completed (due to the greater move in the relative 
prices), as well as decrease the number of trades executed, when compared to a 
closing parameter of both -0,5 and 0.  
 The effect of changing the closing parameter to -1 standard deviation could 
either drive outperformance or underperformance relative to the (2;-0,5) trading 
strategy. This is as a result of both a decreased number of sources of return generation 
(a lower number of executed trades), as well as an increased return generation per 
round trip completed.  
 
 Table 4.1 presents an analysis of the strategy’s performance. The performance 
of the (2;-1) strategy is compared to the (2;0) and (2;-0,5) sets of trading rules, as they 
are the two most comparable strategies (the 3 standard deviation strategy doesn’t 
share either the open or the close parameter and yielded inferior performance than the 
2 standard deviation strategies). Annualized before-fee returns were more substantial 
than under both comparative strategies, with an average of 73,63%, compared to 
63,69% and 70,54% for the (2;0) and (2;-0,5) strategies respectively. Furthermore, 
due to the expectation of a decreased number of trades, after-fee returns are expected 
to further outperform both the (2;0) and (2;-0,5) strategies. However, whilst the 
average before-fee return was substantially higher than that of the (2;-0.5) strategy, it 
relatively underperformed in 8 out of the 29 sub periods and, as expected (due to the 
substantially higher average before-fee return), outperformed the (2;0) strategy in all 
29 periods. The periods of underperformance relative to the (2;-0,5) strategy were 
randomly spread throughout the period of study, and therefore there doesn’t appear to 
be a shifting level of outperformance between the 2 strategies. All returns yielded by 
the (2;-1) set of trading parameters were significant at the 1% level. In addition to the 
larger returns, the corresponding standard deviations were higher, averaging 0.10 
compared to 0.08 and 0.09 for the (2;0) and (2;-0,5) strategies respectively (the 
standard deviation in every sub period was either equal to or larger than that of the 
 61 
(2;-0.5) strategy, and larger than that of the (2;0) strategy). In spite of the higher 
before-fee returns of the (2;-1) strategy when compared to the (2;0) and (2;-0,5) 
strategies, the increased standard deviations resulted in a lower average before-fee 
Sharpe Ratio of 7.68, compared to 7.84 and 7.99 respectively.  
 
 
 Table 4.1 – Returns Analysis – Unrestricted (2;-1) 
 
 As noted before, increasing the absolute value of the closing parameters 
served to increase the average holding period, which resulted in an increased average 
trade length, as well as average number of open pairs. Holding pairs for increased 
time periods results in a number of pairs not requiring a subsequent opening, resulting 
in fewer trades. Fewer trades in turn results in both lower before-fee returns, as well 
as lower trading costs. This is due to the potential for a pair to have not closed (having 
returned to a -0,5 standard deviation spread, and not a -1 standard deviation spread) 
prior to the following return to a 2 standard deviation spread, and thus only requiring 
to have been opened once, and not having locked in a positive return when closed.  
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This resulted in fewer executed trades in every period (an average of 123), 
when compared to the both the (2;0) strategy (142) and the (2;-0,5) strategy (132). 
The number of trades resulted in a substantial increase in the return per trade, to 
0,26%, when compared to both the (2;0) and the (2;-1) strategies – 0,20% and 0,23% 
respectively.  
 
 
 Table 4.2 – After-fee Analysis – Unrestricted (2;-1) 
 
A breakdown of after-fee returns is summarized in Table 4.2. As hypothesized, 
the (2;-1) strategy outperformed both the (2;0) and (2;-0,5) strategies with respect to 
after-fee returns. The average after-fee trading period return was 18,88% (42,90% 
annualized), substantially higher than 13,26% (29,47% annualized) and 16,80% 
(37,88% annualized) yielded by the (2;0) and (2;-0,5) strategies respectively. 
Significantly, despite the increased standard deviation of the (2;-1) strategy, it resulted 
in a higher after-fee Sharpe Ratio of 4.13, when compared to the (2;-0,5) and (2;0) 
strategies, which were 3.88 and 3.16 respectively.  
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Figure 4 – Before- and After-fee Returns – Unrestricted (2;-1) 
 
Figure 4 displays the before- and after-fee returns yielded by the strategy. It is 
clear that the strategy (similarly to the earlier tested strategies) performed particularly 
well in periods of increased market stress, the trading period with highest return was 
late 1998 and a subsequent period of relative outperformance ran from late 2007 until 
the end of 2009. Due to the market neutral nature of the strategy, increased market 
volatility is expected to result in increased returns due to an expected increase in the 
number of diverging and subsequently converging pairs, should the historic 
relationship hold. Notably, despite the relative out-performance of the periods of 
increased market stress, these periods resulted in an increased number of days 
yielding negative before-fee returns. The 5 periods spanning from late 2007 until the 
end of 2009 on average had 32,8% of negative days, substantially larger than the 
30,90% of negative days yielded by the strategy as a whole. Significantly, the 
downward trend in before- and after-fee returns (with the exception of the period of 
market instability) remains evident. This finding confirms the results of the 
comparative literature on foreign markets, namely Gatev et al. (2006) and Do and 
Faff (2009); however, the decline in performance appears to be less severe and 
positive after-fee returns appear to have still been achievable on the JSE. A potential 
reason for the less severe decline in performance, in comparison to foreign markets 
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(most specifically the S&P500), could be the differing maturities of the markets, and 
the greater likelihood that the EMH doesn’t hold on the JSE. This suggests that the 
downward trend in returns yielded by Pairs trading is likely to continue, until positive 
returns are no longer possible.  
 
 
 Table 4.3 – Top 20 Portfolio Risk and Return Drivers – Unrestricted (2;-1) 
 
A closer analysis of those pairs within the Top20 portfolio that generated the 
risk and return of the strategy is displayed in Table 4.3. Returns, as well as standard 
deviations, increased for all three of the portfolios – namely Top20, Top5 and 
Bottom5. In addition, diversification benefits were, as expected, still evident. The 
Top20 portfolio yielded higher returns (when compared to the respective 5 pair 
portfolios), as well as lower average standard deviations, which resulted in 
substantially higher Sharpe Ratios, as well as more significant t-statistics. 
 
 The second half of Table 4.4 sets out a profitability breakdown of the (2;-1) 
set of trading rules. When compared to the (2;-0.5) set of trading rules, both the 
average percentage of days that yielded a negative return, as well as the average 
percentage of pairs that yielded a negative return were very similar. The (2;-1) 
strategy had, on average, 30.90% days yielding negative returns, marginally more 
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then the 30,23% and 30.51% of days in the (2;0) and (2;-0.5) sets of trading rules 
respectively. However, the number of pairs that yielded a negative return decreased to 
2.41% from 3.45% and 3.10% respectively. The decline in the average number of 
pairs that yielded a negative return was driven both by a larger number of sub-periods 
in which no pairs yielded negative returns, as well as the maximum number of pairs 
yielding a negative return in any individual period declining from 15% (3 pairs) and 
20% (4 pairs) respectively, to 10% (2 pairs).  
 
 
 Table 4.4 – Profitability Analysis – Unrestricted (2;-1) 
 
 As observed under all the other sets of trading rules, for the majority of the 
sub periods (with the exception of 3), the absolute value of the maximum return was 
larger than the absolute value of the minimum daily return. The average maximum 
daily return was 2.34%, while the minimum daily return was only -1.33%. The 
comparative maximum daily returns for the (2;0) and (2;-0,5) strategies were 2.13% 
and 2.20% respectively, while the minimum daily returns were -1.18% and -1.20%. 
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The absolute value of both the maximum and minimum daily returns on the (2;-1) 
strategy were greater than both of the comparative strategies. The elevated volatility 
(as evidenced by the higher standard deviation) alluded to this fact. 
 
 Clearly, the strategy outperformed both the (2;0) and (2;-0,5) strategies in 
terms of both before- and after-fee returns. The increase in the return per round trip 
completed was more substantial than the decrease in returns as a result of the decrease 
in the number of executed trades. Furthermore, higher returns were yielded at higher 
standard deviations, however, the resultant Sharpe Ratios were lower before-fees and 
higher after-fees. It would then be expected to be a preferred strategy for an investor 
due both to a larger gross return as well as a better after-fee risk adjusted return. 
 As observed with all of the previously tested strategies, both before- and 
after-fee returns appear to be on a downward trend. Furthermore, returns appear to 
have remained positively correlated to the level of market volatility. 
 
5.1.1.5   Unrestricted (2;-2) 
  
 Having concluded that an opening parameter of 2 standard deviations resulted 
in superior before- and after-fee performance relative to an opening parameter of 3 
standard deviations, a further strategy using an opening parameter of 2 standard 
deviations was tested. It is assumed that a larger opening parameter than 3 standard 
deviations will serve as a further drag on the performance of the trading strategy, due 
to the same factors that caused returns to decrease when the opening parameter was 
shifted from 2 to 3, and therefore no larger opening parameters have been tested. With 
regards to a closing signal, changing the closing parameter from 0 standard deviations, 
to -0,5 standard deviations, and finally to -1 standard deviations resulted in improved 
performance with incremental change. Therefore, a larger (negative) closing signal of 
-2 standard deviations was tested, with an opening parameter of 2 standard deviations 
(due to its relative outperformance).  
It is hypothesized that this strategy will yield higher before- and after-fee 
returns than the comparative (2;-1) strategy. The expectation arises as a result of the 
increased return that will be yielded per round trip completed (a 4 standard deviation 
relative shift in prices, compared to 3 standard deviations), as well as the lower fees as 
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a result of the lower number of trades. Furthermore, similar changes in the closing 
signal (from 0 to -0,5 and finally to -1) resulted in improved performance. However, it 
must be noted that the substantially increased closing parameter of 2 standard 
deviations could potentially result in a marked decline in the number of pairs that 
open (due to them having not closed), and therefore the sources of return, which could 
potentially result in poorer returns. Furthermore, the longer holding period is likely to 
increase the strategy’s standard deviation as a result of the increased return per 
completed round trip. A longer holding period allows for greater return volatility.  
 
 
 Table 5.1 – Returns Analysis – Unrestricted (2;-2) 
 
The before-fee effect of these changes can be determined from the returns 
analysis that is displayed in Table 5.1. Before-fee annualized return increased to 
76.83% (all 29 sub periods’ returns were significant at the 1% level) from 73.63% for 
the (2;-1) strategy. The (2;-2) strategy yielded higher returns in all but 7 of the 29 
trading periods. The increased returns of the strategy were, however, more volatile 
than the comparative strategy, resulting in an increased standard deviation of 0,11, 
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compared to 0,10. Despite the increased returns, the higher standard deviations 
resulted in a substantially lower (yet still substantial) before-fee Sharpe Ratio of 7.16. 
In comparison, the (2;-1) strategy resulted in an average before-fee Sharpe Ratio of 
7.68. The average trade length was substantially longer when compared to the (2;-1) 
strategy, increasing from 13,24 days to 21.76 days (an increase of 64,35%), as a result 
of the greater relative price shift required to close the position. Furthermore, the 
longer average trade length, when compared to the (2;-1) trading strategy, resulted in 
a higher average number of open pairs, with an average of 18.27 pairs open (the 
portfolio was, on average, over 90% invested), compared to 12.73 pairs (on average, 
less then 65% of the portfolio was invested). The particularly high average number of 
open pairs under the (2;-2) strategy is a result of the absolute value of the open and 
close parameters being equal, which means that when a pair closes, it is subsequently 
reopened with opposite positions taken in the underlying shares. An increased average 
number of open pairs results in a more efficient use of allocated capital, therefore, 
evidently the (2;-2) strategy had a substantially more efficient use of its capital then 
the comparative (2;-1) strategy. A drastically increased average trade length, coupled 
with a larger average number of open pairs, resulted in a substantially lower number 
of executed trades when compared to any of the strategy’s with a 2 standard deviation 
opening parameter. On average, only 106 trades were executed per trading period, 
when compared to 123 trades under the (2;-1) strategy and 142 trades under the (2;0) 
strategy, a reduction of 14% and 25% respectively.  
Significantly, the before-fee return per trade of 0.31% was substantially higher 
than that of the (2;-1) (0.26%) strategy. The increased before-fee return per trade was 
a result of an increased before-fee return, coupled with a lower number of trades 
executed. 
 
 Table 5.3 displays the profitability and risk breakdown of the set of trading 
rules. The largest driver of the increased standard deviation of the strategy, similarly 
to the (2;-1) strategy, was the Bottom5 pair portfolio. The Bottom5 portfolio’s 
standard deviation increased from 0.15 to 0.19, while the Top5 portfolio’s standard 
deviation also increased markedly, but to a lesser degree (from 0.15 to 0.17). In 
addition to the increased standard deviation, the Bottom5 portfolio realized an 
increased before-fee return of 77.27%, compared to 71.34%. The Top5 portfolio also 
realized larger returns, increasing from 68.99% to 70.93%.  
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 Despite the superior before-fee returns, the risk adjusted before-fee returns 
(Sharpe Ratio) of the Top20 (7.16), Top5 (3.84) and Bottom5 (4.20) portfolios were 
less significant than their comparatives under the (2;-1) strategy (7.68, 4.47 and 4.60 
respectively). The lower Sharpe Ratios were a result of higher standard deviations, 
and in spite of higher returns. The increased returns were coupled with more 
substantial increases in the associated standard deviations.   
 A returns analysis is displayed in Table 5.4. The number of pairs that opened 
in each period was exactly the same as the other strategies tested using a 2 standard 
deviation opening parameter, due to the strategies sharing an opening parameter. All 
20 pairs opened in almost every sub period, with a minimum of 19 pairs having 
opened in a single period. Thus, the difference between the Return on Committed 
Capital (76,83%) and the Fully Invested Return (77,36%) was negligibly different. 
 
 
Table 5.3 – Top 20 Portfolio Risk and Return Drivers – Unrestricted (2;-2) 
 
The increased standard deviations were evident in the average maximum and 
minimum daily returns yielded by the strategy. The average maximum daily return of 
2.60% was larger than under both the (2;-1) and (2;-0,5) strategies; 2.34% and 2.20% 
respectively. In addition, the average maximum daily drawdown of -1.59% was more 
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significant when compared to -1.33% and -1.20%. Contrary to expectations, (as 
increased volatility should lead to a greater relative number of periods in which the 
maximum daily drawdown is larger than the maximum daily return) the absolute 
value of the minimum daily return was larger than the maximum daily return in only 2 
out of the 29 sub periods, compared to 3 sub periods under the (2;-1) strategy and 1 
sub period under the (2;-0,5) strategy. Further highlighting the increased volatility of 
the strategy, the percentage of days yielding a negative return (32.44%) increased 
from 30.90% and 30.51%, under the (2;-1) and (2;-0,5) strategies respectively. The 
average percentage of negative pairs (3.62%) also increased, from 2.41% and 3.10%. 
Despite the increased negative returns when compared to the (2;-1) and (2;-0,5) 
strategies, both in terms of frequency and size, the (2;-2) strategy still resulted in more 
significant before-fee returns. As concluded for previously tested strategies, returns 
were not only more frequently positive, but on average, positive returns were larger 
than negative returns. 
 
 
 Table 5.4 – Profitability Analysis – Unrestricted (2;-2) 
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 An analysis of the after-fee returns is summarized in Table 5.2, again only for 
an institutional investor incurring 10 bips of brokerage costs per trade and ignoring 
scrip borrowing costs. The average after-fee return was 21,72% per period (49,87% 
annualized). After-fee returns were greater than the 18,88% (42,90% annualized) and 
16,80% (37,88% annualized) yielded by the (2;-1) and (2;-0,5) strategies respectively. 
 Significantly, the higher after-fee returns yielded by the (2;-2) strategy, despite 
the increased standard deviations of the strategy, resulted in a higher average after-fee 
Sharpe Ratio (4.39) than the comparative strategies. The (2;-1) and (2;-0,5) strategies 
yielded average after-fee Sharpe Ratios of 4.13 and 3.88 respectively. It must be 
noted once again that Pairs trading appears to be a particularly low risk strategy, and 
all 3 Sharpe Ratios are significant. The majority of investors would therefore be likely 
to be willing to take on the marginally higher volatility of the (2;-2) strategy in order 
to yield the increased returns.  
 
 
 Table 5.2 – After-fee Analysis – Unrestricted (2;-2) 
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 Figure 5 plots the before- and after-fee returns yielded by the strategy. As 
observed under all of the prior tested trading strategies, with the exclusion of the 
period of increased market instability (starting mid 2007 and running till late 2009), 
the before- and after-fee returns appear to be on a downward trend. However, 
significantly, from the middle of 2010 until the end of the study period (mid 2012), 
both before- and after-fee returns appear to have been on an upward trend. This 
upward trend towards the end of the study period is in contrast to the comparative 
strategies.  
 
 
 Figure 5 – Before- and After-fee Returns 
 
 Thus, for the sample tested, it appears that each incremental shift of the 
closing parameter from 0 standard deviations to -2 standard deviations served to 
increase both the before- and after-fee returns of Pairs trading. However, the 
increased returns came at the expense of increased volatility of the strategy’s returns. 
The increased volatility of the strategy resulted in lower before-fee Sharpe Ratios, 
while the strategies outperformed on a net of fee Sharpe Ratio metric. 
 Pairs trading is naturally a low risk trading strategy as a result of the near 
market neutral (equal long and short positions, which primarily tend to be from the 
same sector) positions. Therefore, an investor would be more likely to take on the 
marginally increased levels of risk to bolster their returns. 
 
18,4%
18,6%
18,8%
19%
19,2%
19,4%
19,6%
19,8%
20%
20,2%
0,00%%
50,00%%
100,00%%
150,00%%
200,00%%
250,00%%
1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20% 21% 22% 23% 24% 25% 26% 27% 28% 29%
R%
R%(Net%Fee)%
Pairs%Opened%
 73 
 Due to an opening parameter of 3 standard deviations resulting in poorer 
before- and after-fee returns, a closing parameter of 3 standard deviations is expected 
to yield inferior results to a closing parameter of 2 standard deviations, and therefore, 
was not tested. 
 
5.1.2  Sector Restricted  
 
Both Do and Faff (2009) and Gatev et al. (2006) concluded that restricting the 
pairing of shares to within the same sector served to improve the performance of Pairs 
trading. Significantly, Do and Faff (2009) concluded that despite the substantially 
reduced returns yielded, to the point of statistical insignificance, by Pairs trading on 
the S&P500 over time, applying sector restrictions could still result in statistically 
significant returns.  
The sector restrictions in this study are relatively loosely defined, and 
therefore leave potential room for further research and possible strategy improvement. 
Firstly, pairs are only restricted to pairs within the Industrial and Financial (FINDI) 
and Resources (RESI) sectors. The JSE isn’t as diversified an exchange as the 
S&P500 and has a smaller investible universe, it therefore offers less scope to sector 
restrict pairs. Furthermore, the utilities sector on the JSE is essentially non-existent, 
and Utilities shares are therefore not separated from Industrials. One could examine 
whether splitting the Financial and Industrial sectors would have an effect on the 
performance of a Pairs trading strategy on the JSE, but would run the risk of having 
too many sectors with too few investible pair iterations. Too few possible pair 
iterations would be likely to result in pairs being formed of shares without a 
sufficiently close historical price relationship. 
 Secondly, the portfolios constructed under the sector-restricted section of this 
study required only that the pairs in the portfolio be sector paired. This was done 
instead of creating two portfolios, one consisting of only the Top20 RESI and another 
consisting of only the Top20 FINDI pairs. The rationale behind this is that should two 
20 pair portfolios be created, a very large portion of the Top80 shares used in this 
research study would have to be used in the pairing. This would serve to force pairing 
between shares with a substantially increased average sum of the squared distances 
between their normalized historic prices, which could potentially result in the pair 
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relationship failing to hold. An obvious limitation of the method used is that in a 
number of sub periods the sector-restricted portfolios are exactly the same as (or very 
similar to) the Unrestricted sample, due to pairs frequently naturally pairing 
themselves within sectors. For example, banks are, for the most part, exposed to the 
same external factors (interest rates etc.). These external factors cause the shares to be 
affected by the same shocks to the market, and therefore more likely to move together. 
Similarly, gold mining shares have large factor exposures to the gold price and the 
Rand/Dollar exchange rate. Essentially, even in the case of Unrestricted pairing, 
shares within sectors have a tendency to pair themselves.  
 
 
Table 6 – Breakdown of Pairs under Unrestricted Pairing 
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 Table 6 displays a breakdown of the pairs making up the Top20 portfolio for 
the Unrestricted (U) and Sector Restricted (SR) portfolios. As can be seen, the U 
sample had as many as 9 sub periods that had no mixed pairs in the Top20 portfolio, 
and therefore the Unrestricted and Sector Restricted results for those sub periods were 
exactly the same. The largest number of mixed pairs in a sub period was 7 out of the 
20 pairs, and this occurred in only 5 of the sub periods, with 5 mixed pairs occurring 
twice. The remaining 13 sub periods had between 1 and 4 mixed pairs. It is also noted 
that the majority of the pairs in both the Unrestricted as well as Sector Restricted 
samples are from the FINDI sector, with 69,14% and 78,1% of pairs respectively. 
However, this may have been as a result of there being a larger number of shares in 
the FINDI sector then the RESI sector.  
 
While there is scope for further research into whether stricter sector 
restrictions benefit Pairs trading, Figure 6 illustrates that for the Unrestricted sample, 
returns appear to have moved in relation to, and in the same direction as, the number 
of mixed pairs in the Top20 portfolio. It must however be noted that the relationship 
of the co-movement appears to be weak. Perhaps the mixed pairs in the Top20 
portfolio of the Unrestricted sample paired up due to unforeseen relationships, which 
led to positive returns. 
 
 
Figure 6 – Number of Mixed Pairs vs Return  
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Furthermore, a relatively common trading strategy is to pair fundamentally 
similar shares and trade them when they diverge from their historical relationship. 
Thus, a Sector Restricted strategy is likely to create identical pairs to that of a 
completely different quantitative trading strategy and thus have more players in the 
market, causing potential profits to be more quickly arbitraged away. 
 
For the Sector Restricted portfolios, testing the discrepancies in returns and 
standard deviations between the Top20, Top5 and Bottom5 portfolios was not carried 
out. The reasoning underlying this is that any new pair that was included in the Sector 
Restricted portfolios will have been in the Bottom5 portfolio, and in no cases would 
have made it into the Top5 portfolio. This is due to no more then 7 pairs in any of the 
sub-periods having been mixed. By definition, any mixed pairs that were replaced by 
a Sector Restricted pair will have had a larger SSD then any of the pairs in the 
Unrestricted 20 pair portfolio, and thus would be included in the Bottom5 portfolio. 
Thus the changes brought on by sector restriction will make the analysis of the sub 
portfolios worthless. 
 
5.1.2.1 Sector Restricted (2;0) 
The first Sector Restricted strategy that was tested was the basic (2;0) set of 
trading rules. This was to allow comparison to both this study’s basic strategy, as well 
as to foreign literature, most notably Do and Faff (2009) and Gatev et al. (2006).  
 
 The Top20 portfolio before-fee performance is summarized in Table 7.1. 
When compared to the Unrestricted (2;0) trading strategy, it can be seen that the 
average before-fee annualized return of 61,28% was marginally lower when 
compared to 63,69%. In terms of before-fee returns, the Sector Restricted portfolio 
outperformed (underperformed) in 6 (3) of the first 13 sub periods, and 0 (11) of the 
last 16 sub periods (the remainder of the periods had equal returns due to the same 20 
pairs being in the portfolio). It appears that there has been a shift over time that has 
resulted in the Sector Restricted portfolio to start relatively underperforming the 
Unrestricted portfolio on the JSE. This is in stark contrast to the findings of Do and 
Faff (2009) and Gatev et al. (2006), who concluded that when Unrestricted pairing 
has ceased to yield statistically positive returns on the S&P500, applying sector 
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restrictions to the pairing served to increase returns. All 29 sub-period returns were 
significant at the 2% level, and 27 were significant at the 1% level.  
 
 
 Table 7.1 – Return Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;0) 
 
 It was expected that imposing a sector restriction on the formation of pairs 
would serve to decrease the level of risk associated with Pairs trading, as shares in the 
same sector are more likely to be fundamentally similar (due to them being affected 
by similar external factors), and therefore non-convergence risk should theoretically 
decrease. However, the reductions in standard deviations were marginal, from an 
average of 0,082 for the Unrestricted portfolio, to 0,079 for the Sector Restricted 
portfolio. The standard deviation of the Unrestricted portfolio was higher (lower) than 
that of the Sector Restricted portfolio in 11 (3) of the sub periods, and thus it appears 
that applying a sector restriction did in fact offer a risk reduction more frequently than 
not, however, the benefits were marginal. Due to the low risk inherent in the 
Unrestricted Pairs trading strategy, the risk reduction of sector-restriction was 
negligible, as evidenced by the comparative Sharpe Ratios of the two strategies. The 
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marginally lower before-fee returns and negligibly small difference in standard 
deviations led to similar before-fee Sharpe Ratio’s for the two strategies. On average, 
7.84 for the Unrestricted portfolio and 7.77 for the Sector Restricted portfolio. 
Evidently, sector restriction resulted in a relatively larger reduction in before-fee 
returns than standard deviations.   
 
 
 Table 7.2 – After-fee Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;0) 
  
Due to the nature of the study, the average sum of the squared distances 
increased when a sector restriction was imposed (from 13.30 to 13.89), and would 
have increased to a larger degree should stricter restrictions (such as a FINDI 
portfolio and a RESI portfolio, or further splitting FINDI into FINI and INI) have 
been imposed. Both the average number of open pairs (8,62 compared to 8.74), as 
well as the average trade length (7,82 days compared to 7,88) decreased, but 
negligibly so. This finding is contrary to expectations as the larger average sum of the 
squared distances of the Sector Restricted pairs led to the expectation that more 
historically dissimilar pairs would potentially diverge from their historic relationship 
more regularly, and be less likely to converge to a weaker historical relationship as 
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quickly. However, a potential driver behind the shorter average trade length, and 
therefore the average number of open pairs, is that the common external factors 
affecting both shares in a Sector Restricted pair are likely to drive faster convergence. 
The average number of trades executed was almost unchanged, at 141, compared to 
142. This resulted in an almost identical number of sources of return as well as net 
trading costs (however, scrip borrowing costs could potentially vary between the 
strategies should one strategy favour more liquid shares). Both the Unrestricted as 
well as the Sector Restricted portfolios had a larger number of executed trades than 
the other in 9 of the sub-periods. In addition, the two portfolios required the same 
number of trades in the remaining 11 sub-periods (however, of these 11 sub-periods, 9 
contained the same 20 pairs as mentioned above).  
 The marginally lower return, coupled with a marginally lower number of 
trades, decreased the average return per trade from 0.098% to 0.095%. 
 
 
 Figure 7 – Before- and After-fee Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;0) 
 
Table 7.2 summarizes the after-fee performance of the Sector Restricted (2;0) 
strategy. The average trading period (125-day) before-fee return was 26.56%, which 
resulted in an average after-fee trading period return of 12,46% (27,62% annualized). 
Comparatively, the Unrestricted portfolio yielded a 125-day before-fee return of 
27,46%, and an after-fee return of 13,26% (29,47% annualized). The after-fee Sharpe 
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Ratios for the Sector Restricted and Unrestricted portfolios were 6.77 and 6.86 
respectively. Evidently the Unrestricted portfolio yielded superior before- and after-
fee net returns, as well as risk-adjusted returns, despite the minor risk reduction of 
sector restriction. 
 Figure 7 displays the before- and after-fee returns of the Sector Restricted 
portfolio. A familiar pattern to the Unrestricted portfolio was observed, being a 
downward trend in both before- and after-fee returns, with the exception of the period 
of increased market volatility. 
 
 
  Table 7.3 – Profitability Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;0) 
 
A profitability analysis of the strategy is outlined in Table 7.3. The lenient 
trading parameters of opening a position at 2 standard deviations and closing it at the 
next zero standard deviation convergence of prices resulted in a large number of pairs 
opening in each of the 29 sub periods, with all 20 pairs in 25 of the 29 period, and 19 
opening in the remaining 4 periods, averaging 19,86 pairs (the same figures as under 
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the Unrestricted sample). The large number of pairs that opened made the difference 
between the Return on Committed Capital and the Fully Invested Return negligible. 
 
 As observed under the Unrestricted sample, very few of the pairs yielded 
negative before-fee returns. An average of only 3.45% of pairs in a sub-period yielded 
negative returns; with a maximum of 15% (3 pairs) of pairs yielding a negative return. 
Coincidently, these results were exactly the same as under the Unrestricted sample, 
however the distribution of the negative pairs was somewhat different. The 
percentage of days that yielded negative returns ranged between 21.60% and 40.00%, 
and averaged 30.70% – the range was slightly narrower then that of the Unrestricted 
sample (20,8% to 40.80%) but at a negligibly higher average (30.23% for the 
Unrestricted sample). The slightly narrower range of negative returns was expected, 
due to the marginally lower standard deviations of the returns yielded.  
 The absolute value of the maximum daily return was higher then the absolute 
value of the minimum daily return in 27 out of the 29 sub periods (26 out of 29 for the 
Unrestricted sample). The maximum and minimum daily returns averaged 2.12% and 
-1.08% respectively. These results were similar to the Unrestricted sample, which 
averaged 2.13% and -1.18% respectively. The wider spread between the maximum 
and minimum daily returns again reflecting the higher standard deviation, and 
associated risk, of the Unrestricted sample. As noted for all the previously tested 
strategies, before-fee returns were more often than not positive (both in terms of days 
as well as pairs). Furthermore, positive returns, on average, were larger then negative 
returns.  
 
 It appears that applying sector-restrictions to a Pairs trading strategy on the 
JSE served to decrease returns (both before and after fees), while not sufficiently 
decreasing the associated risk (standard deviation) to sufficiently compensate an 
investor for the reduction in returns. The lower resultant Sharpe Ratios under the 
Sector Restricted (in comparison to the Unrestricted portfolio) portfolio highlighted 
the uneven levels of risk and return reductions that arose as a result of applying sector 
restrictions to the strategy. The underperformance of the Sector Restricted portfolio 
appears to have been a growing trend, with a number of sub periods of relative 
outperformance occurring earlier in the period of study and no periods of relative 
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outperformance in the latter periods. It remains to be seen whether or not these 
findings remain observable after varying the trading rules. 
 
5.1.2.2 Sector Restricted (2;-2) 
  
 The Unrestricted (2;-2) strategy yielded the highest after-fee returns, although, 
not the highest after-fee Sharpe Ratios due to relatively larger standard deviations. 
However, as noted earlier, Pairs trading is, by its construction, a particularly low risk 
strategy, and therefore an investor would be more likely to opt for increased returns 
than marginal risk reduction. The (2;0) Sector Restricted portfolio lagged its 
comparative Unrestricted portfolio, and therefore underperformance is expected 
relative to the comparable Unrestricted (2;-2) trading strategy. Furthermore, due to the 
substantial outperformance of the Unrestricted (2;-2) trading strategy when compared 
to the Unrestricted (2;0) trading strategy, outperformance is expected over the Sector 
Restricted (2;0) trading strategy. 
 
 
 Table 8.1 – Returns Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;-2) 
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Table 8.1 summarizes the before-fee performance of the Sector Restricted 
portfolio of pairs when traded according to a (2;-2) set of trade execution parameters. 
As hypothesized, the annualized before-fee return of 72,66% (all 29 trading sub-
periods’ returns were significant at the 1% level) was higher than that of the Sector 
Restricted (2;0) set of trading rules’ return of 61,38%. Furthermore, as expected, the 
72,66% annualized return lagged the Unrestricted (2;-2) portfolio’s return of 76,83%. 
The standard deviation of returns was substantially higher than that of the (2;0) Sector 
Restricted portfolio, at 0,104 when compared to 0,079.  The Unrestricted portfolio 
tested with the (2;-2) set of trading parameters returned a standard deviation of 0,106 
which was higher than both the (2;0) and (2;-2) Sector Restricted strategies. Thus, as 
noted under the Unrestricted sample, increasing the absolute value of the closing 
parameter (while keeping the opening parameter constant) serves to increase the 
associated risk (as observed through a larger standard deviation) of a Pairs trading 
strategy. However, applying a sector restriction to the formation of pairs appears to 
marginally decrease the risk of the trading strategy, when compared to an Unrestricted 
portfolio traded under the same set of trading parameters. The before-fee Sharpe Ratio 
of the strategy was 6.96, and lagged that of the Sector Restricted (2;0) portfolio (7.77) 
due to the higher standard deviation, and in spite of the higher before-fee return. 
Furthermore, the Sharpe Ratio also lagged that of the Unrestricted (2;-2) strategy 
(7.16) due to the lower return, and in spite of the lower standard deviation. As 
observed under the Unrestricted sample, the (2;-2) trading strategy offered improved 
before-fee returns when compared to a (2;0) trading strategy, however, the increased 
standard deviation resulted in a decreased before-fee Sharpe Ratio (worse risk 
adjusted performance). Furthermore, as noted under the Sector Restricted (2;0) 
trading strategy, applying a sector restriction to a Pairs trading strategy on the JSE 
appears to have marginally decreased the level of risk associated with Pairs trading. 
However, before-fee returns were also lower, and to a comparatively larger degree 
thaen the standard deviations, resulting in worse risk adjusted returns (Sharpe Ratios) 
than the Unrestricted sample.  
Both the average number of open pairs (18,17), as well as the average trade 
length (21,76 days), were substantially larger than under the Sector Restricted (2;0) 
strategy – 8,62 and 7,82 respectively. This is consistent with the observation under the 
Unrestricted sample tested with the (2;-2) set of trading parameters (an increased 
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ANOP and ATL when compared to the (2;0) Unrestricted trading parameters). 
However, both the ATL, as well as the ANOP, were marginally lower for the Sector 
Restricted (2;-2) portfolio than for the Unrestricted (2;-2) strategy. Intuitively, it was 
expected that the Sector Restricted sample would have had a longer ATL, and 
therefore a higher ANOP, than the comparative Unrestricted sample due to the 
relatively poor historical price relationship of the pairs (as evidenced by the higher 
average sum of the squared differences). However, the counterintuitive results are 
likely as a result of similar external factors affecting shares within the same sectors 
resulting in quicker convergence.  
 
 
Table 8.3 – Profitability Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;-2) 
  
Furthermore, as observed under the Unrestricted (2;-2) strategy, the average 
number of executed trades under the Sector Restricted (2;-2) strategy was 
substantially lower than the Sector Restricted (2;0) strategy, at 106 compared to 141 
(a decrease of 25%). The average number of executed trades was identical to the 106 
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trades under the Unrestricted (2;-2) strategy. Again, this was as a result of a number 
of positions having not closed (reached -2 standard deviations) when the spread 
returned to 2 standard deviations. A position that would otherwise have been 
reopened under the (2;0) strategy was still open, and therefore wouldn’t require 
additional trades being executed. The increased returns, as well as decreased number 
of trades, resulted in a substantially higher before-fee return per trade of 0,30%, 
compared to 0,19% under the (2;0) Sector Restricted strategy. Furthermore, as 
hypothesized, the return per trade was lower than the 0,31% yielded under the 
Unrestricted (2;-2) portfolio.  
 
 A returns analysis is displayed in Table 8.3. As with all strategies opening at 2 
standard deviations, the average number of pairs that traded in a period was 19,86, 
meaning that every pair opened in almost every sub period and thus the difference 
between the Return on Committed Capital and the Fully Invested Return was 
negligibly different. The increased volatility of the strategy when compared to the 
Sector Restricted (2;0) strategy, as highlighted by the increased standard deviations, 
was evident in the maximum before-fee daily return of 2.45% being substantially 
larger than the maximum daily return of 2.12% yielded under the (2;0) strategy. 
Similarly, the absolute value of the minimum daily return (-1.47%) was substantially 
larger than the absolute value of the minimum daily return (-1.08%) yielded by the 
Sector Restricted (2;0) strategy. These daily return metrics were marginally less 
volatile (as already highlighted by the smaller standard deviation) than under the 
Unrestricted (2;-2) portfolio, which ranged between -1,59% and 2,60%. The average 
percentage of days that yielded a negative return was 32,39%, which (as expected) 
was marginally more than the Sector Restricted (2;0) strategy (30.70%), and 
marginally less than the respective Unrestricted strategy (32.44%). However, the 
average percentage of pairs that yielded a negative return was 3,79%, and was larger 
than both comparative strategies (both the Sector Restricted (2;0) and the Unrestricted 
(2;-2) strategies – 3.45% and 3.62% respectively), albeit marginally so. Thus, it is 
evident that the Sector Restricted (2;-2) trading strategy increased the associated risk 
and return when compared to the (2;0) set of trading rules imposed on a Sector 
Restricted portfolio. Furthermore, the associated return and risk was reduced in 
comparison to the comparative (2;-2) Unrestricted portfolio.  
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Table 8.2 – After-fee Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;-2) 
 
Table 8.2 lays out the after-fee returns yielded by the trading strategy. After-
fee analysis was only done with regard to an institutional investors level of brokerage 
fees (10 bips per trade), and excluding any scrip borrowing costs. The average before-
fee trading period (125-day) return was 30.79%, with (an average of) 106 trades 
having been executed. Thus, the after-fee return an institutional investor would have 
yielded was on average 20,23% (46,16% annualized). The lowest 125-day after-fee 
return was 4,13% and a maximum of 65,74% although the maximum was in Trading 
Period 1 (TP1), and is an outlier (41,46% was the second highest 125-day return). As 
hypothesized, annualized after-fee returns were more significant under the (2;-2) 
Sector Restricted strategy than for the comparative (2;0) Sector Restricted strategy 
(12,46% per period and 27,62% annualized), while lagging that of the (2;-2) 
Unrestricted strategy (21,72% per period and 49,87% annualized). Respective after-
fee Sharpe Ratios were 4.15, 3.02 and 4.39 for the Sector Restricted (2;-2), (2;0) and 
Unrestricted (2;-2) strategies respectively. As hypothesized, the Sector Restricted (2;-
2) strategy underperformed the Unrestricted (2;-2) strategy on both a returns, as well 
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as a risk-adjusted returns, basis. Furthermore, despite the Sector Restricted (2;-2) 
strategy underperforming the Sector Restricted (2;0) strategy on a before-fee Sharpe 
Ratio basis, the substantially lower number of associated trades resulted in lower 
trading costs, and therefore a higher after-fee Sharpe Ratio, and thus the (2;-2) 
strategy outperformed the (2;0) strategy on an after-fee risk adjusted basis.  
Furthermore, applying sector restriction to pairs' formation resulted in a lower 
standard deviation than under a comparative Unrestricted portfolio, while reducing 
returns to a comparatively larger degree, resulting in lower before- and after-fee 
Sharpe Ratios.  
 
 Figure 8 displays the before- and after-fee returns of the Sector Restricted (2;-
2) strategy over time. The downward trend in before- and after-fee returns (again, 
with the exception of the period of increased market volatility) is once again evident. 
 
 
 Figure 8 – Before- and After-fee Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;-2) 
 
As concluded under the (2;0) Sector Restricted strategy, it appears that Sector 
Restricted strategies offer a minor reduction in associated risk (as highlighted by 
marginally lower standard deviations) when compared to their respective Unrestricted 
strategies. It is concluded that this is as a result of the shares in every pair being 
affected by similar external factors, and thus substantial divergence is less likely to be 
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driven by substantial market shocks. However, the reduced levels of risk were 
accompanied by comparatively more substantial decreases in their yielded returns, 
which resulted in reduced Sharpe Ratios, and thus lower risk adjusted returns.  
Significantly, the observation of relative outperformance of the -2 closing 
parameter when compared to a 0 standard deviation closing parameter (and using a 
consistent opening parameter of 2 standard deviations) under the Unrestricted sample 
remained evident under the Sector Restricted portfolio. 
 
 
5.1.2.3  Sector Restricted (2;-0,5) 
 
 
Table 9.1 – Returns Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;-0,5)  
 
The two Sector Restricted strategies that have been tested thus far have been 
the (2;0) and the (2;-2) sets of trading parameters. The rationale behind this is that the 
(2;0) trading strategy is the basic trading strategy of this study, and the (2;-2) strategy 
resulted in the highest after-fee returns under the Unrestricted sample. A final strategy 
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to be tested is the (2;-0,5) trading strategy, as it yielded the highest after-fee Sharpe 
Ratio when tested on the Unrestricted sample. It is expected that the (2;-0,5) strategy 
will outperform the Sector Restricted (2;0) strategy, while underperforming the 
Unrestricted (2;-0,5) strategy with regards to both returns as well as Sharpe Ratios. 
Furthermore, it is expected to underperform both the Sector Restricted and 
Unrestricted (2;-2) strategies with regards to returns, while outperformance is 
expected with regards to Sharpe Ratios. 
 
 
  Table 9.2 – After-fee Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;-0,5) 
 
Table 9.1 lays out the before-fee performance of the strategy. As hypothesized, 
the average before-fee return of 67,19% was greater than the 61,38% yielded by the 
Sector Restricted (2;0) strategy, and smaller than the 70,54% yielded by the 
Unrestricted (2;-0,5) strategy. It also lagged the 72,66% yielded by the Sector 
Restricted (2;-2) strategy. As noted earlier, sector restriction resulted in a marginally 
decreased standard deviation of 0.086, compared to 0.088 for the Unrestricted (2;-0,5) 
strategy. Similarly, the incremental shift of the closing parameter resulted in an 
increased standard deviation from 0.79 under the Sector Restricted (2;0) strategy. The 
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resultant Sharpe Ratios were 7.82, 7.77, 6.96 and 7.99 for the Sector Restricted (2;-
0,5), (2;0), (2;-2) and Unrestricted (2;-0,5) strategies respectively. As hypothesized, 
the before-fee return and risk-adjusted return of the Sector Restricted (2;-0,5) strategy 
outperformed that of the Sector Restricted (2;0) strategy, while underperforming the 
Unrestricted (2;-0,5) strategy. Similarly, underperformance relative to the Sector 
Restricted (2;-2) strategy with regards to before-fee returns, and outperformance with 
regards to Sharpe Ratios was observed. 
 
 
 Table 9.3 – Profitability Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;-0,5) 
 
 The strategy required a lower number of trades, 131, when compared to 141 
and 132 for the Sector Restricted (2;0) and Unrestricted (2;-0,5) strategies 
respectively. In comparison to the Sector Restricted (2;0) strategy, the longer holding 
period (2,5 standard deviations compared to 2 standard deviations) could potentially 
be the driving force behind the reduced number of trades. The resultant average trade 
lengths (average number of open pairs) were 10,36 days (10,57 pairs), 7,82 days (8,62 
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pairs) and 10,31 days (10,63 pairs) for the Sector Restricted (2;-0,5), (2;0) and 
Unrestricted (2;-0,5) strategies respectively. 
 As hypothesized, the before-fee return per trade of 0,22% was between 0,19% 
and 0,23% as yielded under the Sector Restricted (2;0) and Unrestricted (2;-0,5) 
strategies respectively. 
 
An after-fee analysis of the strategy is presented in Table 9.2. The average 
125-day return for the Sector Restricted (2;-0,5), (2;0) and Unrestricted (2;-0,5) 
strategies were 28,74%, 26,56% and 30,01% respectively. The resulting after-fee 
returns were 15,66%, 12,46% and 16,80% respectively. Furthermore, the after-fee 
Sharpe Ratios were 3.67, 3.02 and 3.88 for the three respective strategies. As 
hypothesized, the Sector Restricted (2;-0,5) strategy outperformed the Sector 
Restricted (2;0) strategy and underperformed the Unrestricted (2;-0,5) strategy in 
terms of before-and after-fee returns, as well as risk adjusted returns.  
 
 
 Figure 9 – Before- and After-fee Analysis – Sector Restricted (2;-0,5) 
  
Figure 9 plots the before-and after-fee returns yielded by the trading strategy. 
As noted under every earlier tested strategy, a clear downward trend in both before- 
and after-fee returns is evident (with the exception of the period of increased market 
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volatility). Significantly, the downward trend in returns appears to be particularly 
significant. 
 
 A profitability analysis of the trading strategy is laid out in Table 9.3. 
Similarly to all of the other strategies tested using an opening parameter of 2 standard 
deviations, almost every pair opened in every trading period (an average of 19,86 
pairs per period). This resulted in a negligible difference between the Return on 
Committed Capital and the Fully Invested Return. The minimum and maximum daily 
returns yielded by the strategy were -1,18% and 2,17% respectively. The 
comparatives were -1,08% and 2,12%, and -1,20% and 2,20% for the Sector 
Restricted (2;0) and Unrestricted (2;-0,5) strategies respectively. This highlights the 
decreased volatility (risk) in comparison to Unrestricted strategies and increased 
volatility associated with increasing the absolute value of the closing parameter. The 
percentage of days (pairs) yielding a negative return were negligibly different 
between the three strategies at 31,03% (3,10%), 30,70% (3,45%) and 30,51% (3,10%) 
for the Sector Restricted (2;-0,5), (2;0) and Unrestricted (2;-0,5) strategies 
respectively.  
 
 It appears that sector restricting the formation of pairs on the JSE, in its weak 
form, leads to a reduction in both the net returns, as well as the volatility of returns (a 
risk measure) yielded by the strategy. Significantly, however, the reduction in returns 
was comparatively larger than the risk reduction, which led to inferior risk-adjusted 
returns. This observation held true for a number of different strategies tested, namely, 
the basic (2;0) strategy, and another two strategies, the (2;-0,5) and (2;-2) strategies 
which yielded the highest risk adjusted returns and highest returns respectively under 
the Unrestricted sample. Furthermore, the same trading parameters that led to relative 
outperformance under the Unrestricted sample achieved relative outperformance 
when applied to a portfolio of Sector Restricted pairs.  
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5.2  Comparison Over Time 
  
 To compare the performance over time by Pairs trading on the JSE, the period 
of analysis has been split into quarters. As there are an uneven number of sub periods, 
and TP1 appears to be an outlier (perhaps based on older, more dubious data), it has 
been excluded. Thus, the periods of comparison each consist of 7 sub periods of 125 
days each and are just short of a 3.5 year period. The first period runs from 
17/12/1998 until 04/04/2002 and the second period runs from 05/04/2002 until 
11/08/2005, the third from 12/08/2005 until 18/12/2008 and the fourth from 
19/12/2008 until 26/04/2012, which is the end date of the study. The initial strategy 
analyzed will be the portfolio with the best performance (based on after-fee returns), 
namely the Unrestricted sample under the trading parameters of (2;-2). 
 
 
 Table 10.1 – Comparison Over Time – Unrestricted (2;-2) 
 
 Table 10.1 highlights the main differences between the sub periods. 
Significantly, the average before-fee (after-fee) 125 day trading period returns 
decreased substantially over the four sub-periods, from an average of 39,16% 
(28,48%) in the first to 23,70% (13,65%) in the last. It should be noted that after a 
sustained period of relative underperformance in the fourth period, before-fee returns 
in the last period increased to a 5 trading period relative high of 20,49% - spanning 
from the middle of 2010 (Trading Period 25) (20,66%). Another period of sustained 
relative underperformance was seen in trading periods 19 to 24 (07/01/19 to 09/12/03). 
However, periods of relative underperformance tended to occur later in the period of 
study and the overall trend in returns (as highlighted by the returns analysis of the 
quartered sample) was downward. This highlights the decline in returns yielded by 
Pairs trading on the JSE over time, a trend regularly documented in studies based on 
foreign exchanges, most notably Gatev et al. (2006), Do and Faff (2009) on the 
S&P500. While returns appear to have not declined to the same extent on the JSE, it 
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could merely be a function of the maturity of the market and returns could potentially 
be expected to decline further. 
The declining returns were matched with declining standard deviations from 
0,125 to 0,097, followed by a minor increase to 0,099, and finally to 0,086, 
highlighting a decreasing level of associated risk over time. As theorized in Gatev et 
al. (2006), the decline in the standard deviation of the strategy over time could 
explain a decreased exposure to a latent risk factor, which in turn could explain the 
decreasing returns yielded by Pairs trading over time. Higher returns in the earlier 
periods could be compensation for taking on additional risk due to the aforementioned 
latent risk factor. The latent risk factor was not identified in Gatev et al. (2006), and 
this study offers no further explanation as to what the source of the latent risk factor is. 
Despite the decrease of the standard deviations over time, the substantially decreased 
returns led to the Sharpe Ratios also declining from 7.59 to 6.20, highlighting that risk 
adjusted returns yielded by Pairs trading on the JSE appear to be on a downward trend. 
The comparatively drastic decline in both the standard deviation, as well as return, 
from the first to the second sub period highlight the probability of the exposure to a 
latent risk factor that substantially decreased between those two periods.  
 The numbers of executed trades appear to have been relatively constant over 
time, with 107 in the first period, 113 and 105 in the middle two periods, before 
declining to 101 in the final period. Clearly the first period outperformed substantially 
in terms of both return per trade (0.37%, 0.09% higher than the second highest quarter 
and 0.13% higher than the lowest quarter) as well as after-fee returns (28,48%, 9,07% 
higher than the second highest quarter) due to a substantially larger before-fee return. 
The most recent period yielded the poorest performance of the four quarters, based on 
before (23,70%) and after-fee returns (13,65%), return per trade (0.24%) and before-
fee Sharpe Ratio (6.20) yet still yielded substantial after-fee returns at a low level of 
risk (standard deviation).  
 
 The second set of rules that was tested over time is the Unrestricted sample of 
pairs tested according to the basic strategy of (2;0), in order to allow comparisons 
over time to foreign studies. It is summarized in Table 10.2. 
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 The downward trend of before-fee returns was still evident, with returns 
having decreased from 31,71% in the first quarter to only 18,91% in the fourth quarter. 
However, the third quarter bucked the trend, which didn’t happen under the (2;-2) 
strategy, and yielded a higher before-fee average return than the second quarter 
(28,13% compared to 25,39%). As noted under the (2;-2) strategy, relative periods of 
underperformance occurred, and in this case, during the trading periods 12 to 16 
(03/09/12 to 06/02/02), 18 to 20 (06/07/28 to 08/01/03) and 25 to 29 (09/12/04 to 
12/04/26). Again, periods of relative underperformance tended to occur later in the 
period of study. 
 
 
 Table 10.2 – Comparison Over Time – Unrestricted (2;0) 
 
 Consistent with the (2;-2) strategy, standard deviations declined over time, 
from 0.099 to 0.063 and, as expected, in all four sub-periods the (2;0) strategy 
resulted in lower standard deviations than the (2;-2) strategy. The greatest decline in 
standard deviations was present between the first and second quarters, dropping from 
0.099 to 0.076. The largest decline in standard deviation for the (2;-2) strategy 
occurred between the same two quarters, which further serves to suggest a drastic 
decline in an exposure to a latent risk factor that resulted in substantially decreased 
returns. 
 The number of executed trades spiked substantially in the middle two quarters, 
from 137 to 153 and 151, before declining substantially to 129 trades. The number of 
trades resulted in a substantially higher return per trade in the first quarter (0.23%) 
than the other three quarters (dropping as low as 0,15% in the fourth period). 
Significantly, before-fee returns (18,91%) declined so substantially in the fourth 
quarter that the substantial decrease in the number of trades still failed to increase the 
return per trade (0.15%) above that of the other three quarters (a previous low of 
0.17%). 
 Similarly to the before-fee return, the after-fee return of the strategy declined 
over time (with the exception of the third quarter that yielded a slight gain) from 
18,03% to only 5,96%. Due to the decline in the standard deviation, the before-fee 
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Sharpe Ratios spiked in the middle two quarters from 7.48 (in the first quartile) to 
8.05 and 8.67, before finally decreasing substantially to 6.84 in the fourth quartile.  
 
 Both the (2;0) and (2;-2) strategies appear to have declined over time, in terms 
of both before- and after-fee returns. In addition, the standard deviations of returns 
yielded by Pairs trading declined over time, but to a lesser degree than returns, which 
resulted in declining Sharpe Ratios (with the exception of the middle periods in the 
(2;0) strategy). Significantly, the (2;-2) strategy appears to have had a resurgence of 
before- and after-fee returns in the last trading period to a 5 period high.  
 
 The findings in this study are therefore similar to those of comparable studies 
on foreign exchanges, namely, a reduction over time in both before- and after-fee 
returns, as well as standard deviations. However, the return reductions have not been 
to the same degree as on foreign exchanges, and positive returns still appear to be 
achievable through Pairs trading on the JSE. A potential reason for this could be that 
the JSE is a less mature market then the S&P500, and therefore market inefficiencies 
that are identified through quantitative strategies are more easily exploitable. A more 
mature market is more likely to have market inefficiencies arbitraged out (and 
therefore no longer exploitable to earn positive returns) more quickly, and the spreads 
are less likely to widen as substantially due to a greater number of active traders. 
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6 Potential Topics for Future Research 
 
As noted throughout this study, there are a number of potential topics for 
further research into the profitability of Pairs trading on the JSE. They arise from a 
number of reasons, ranging from how sector restrictions were imposed, to the 
potential use of leverage.  
 
The first area for potential future research is comparable methods of stock 
pairing.  A number of other methods that have been tested in earlier papers include 
co-integration, Pearson’s correlation, Spearman’s rank correlation and Beta’s. A 
further study could be conducted to determine whether another of the pairing methods 
could potentially outperform the method tested in this study. 
 
The average Pairs trading strategy in this study was under invested, and a 
number of strategies resulted in, on average, fewer than 50% of pairs in the Top20 
portfolio being open at any one time. Furthermore, the strategies that tended to 
outperform had higher average numbers of open pairs. Therefore, there is potential to 
improve the performance of a number of Pairs trading strategies through the use of 
gearing, by increasing the maximum permitted percentage holding in each pair. 
Another potential area for improvement could be in increasing the investible universe 
of each strategy (still limiting an allocation of 5% of the portfolio to a pair, but 
including a larger number of pairs in the strategy). This could potentially allow for 
better utilization of allocated capital, and therefore improved performance. However, 
both increasing the investible universe and allowing for gearing is likely to increase 
the risk associated with the trading strategies. Allowing for gearing results in more 
concentrated bets, and allowing for more pairs in a strategy could potentially begin to 
include sub optimally paired shares. 
 
Secondly, as alluded to, the sector restrictions imposed on pair formations in 
this study were particularly lenient. There is potential scope for further risk reductions 
that could arise from applying stricter sector restrictions, by splitting up the FINDI 
sector into FINI and INI or creating two 20 pairs portfolios of only FINDI and RESI 
shares respectively. Stricter still, 3 20 pair portfolios could be formed, namely; INI, 
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FINI and RESI. A potential further reduction in the standard deviations of the 
strategies, coupled with potentially smaller decreases in returns could result in 
improved risk adjusted performance.  
 
Another potential room for further research is into potentially forcing pairing 
to occur only between mixed pairs – a completely different strategy to sector 
restriction. Contrary to findings in prior literature, this study found a weak positive 
relationship between the number of mixed pairs in a portfolio and the resultant returns 
yielded by the strategy. Potential research could therefore be conducted in order to 
determine whether this observed relationship is potentially exploitable.  
 
Lastly, it was observed that the returns generated by Pairs trading appear to 
increase during periods of elevated market stress, in particular late 1998, and again 
during the crash period of 2008 are two in sample examples of this. Increased stress 
on the market results in increased market volatility, and it is hypothesized that Pairs 
trading benefits from this increased volatility that surrounds a market crash. The 
increased market volatility could potentially result in a higher number of pairs 
temporarily diverging from their historical relationships, and thus increase the sources 
of return generation temporarily.  
Therefore, potential further research can be done into the Volatility Index 
(VIX) as a leading indicator for potential significant outperformance of Pairs trading. 
However, it must be noted that in periods of increased market stress, the costs 
associated with scrip borrowing (in order to short shares on the market) increase 
drastically.  
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7  Conclusion 
 
 A number of Pairs trading strategies were tested on the JSE over a substantial 
time horizon spanning almost 14 years, ranging from 1998/06/25 to 2012/04/26. The 
period of study included both bull and bear (the crash of 2008) periods on both the 
JSE and international stock markets. Regarding the formation of pairs, trading 
strategies were tested on both an Unrestricted sample, as well as a sample subject to 
sector restrictions. Furthermore, different opening and closing parameters on both the 
Unrestricted and Sector Restricted samples were tested. The methodology utilized for 
the formation, as well as trading, of pairs is similar to the methodologies utilized by 
Gatev et al. (1999), Gatev et al. (2006), Do and Faff (2009), Perlin (2007) and Bolgun 
et al. (2009) in order to aid comparisons between the different literatures. Shares were 
paired through a process of minimizing the sum of the squared distances between 
their normalized price series’. Pairs were then traded in a contrarian manner when 
they diverged from their historic price relationships. A short position was taken in the 
stock that had recently increased in its relative price (to its paired stock), and a long 
position was simultaneously taken in the relative loser. Both the long and the short 
positions were of equal magnitude, and the trading simulation was undertaken out of 
sample from the formation of the pairs on a rolling 125 day basis. 
 
 The results of this study are subject to a number of caveats, primarily with 
respect to the associated costs. Firstly, the brokerage fees included were 10 bips per 
trade, which are substantially lower than an individual investor would pay and in line 
with the expected costs of an institutional investor. Thus, with respect to brokerage 
costs, an individual investor would yield substantially lower after-fee returns.   
 More substantially, scrip borrowing costs have not been included in this study 
due to the unpredictable level of costs, and availability, of scrip on the JSE. The price 
and availability of scrip borrow on the JSE differs greatly between stock tickers. In 
addition to the lack of scrip borrowing costs, the potential costs of a short recall are 
also particularly difficult to forecast and therefore have been excluded from this study. 
The inclusion of costs that are associated with scrip borrowing would result in 
reduced after-fee returns.  
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 The calculation of risk-adjusted returns, particularly in the case of Sharpe 
Ratios, used a risk-free rate of zero. This is due to the strategy being both relatively 
market neutral and self-funding, as a result of the equal magnitude of the long and 
short positions.  
 
 It was concluded that all 8 of the Pairs trading strategies tested yielded 
economically and statistically significant before- and after-fee returns. Average 
annualized before-fee returns ranged from 42,19% to 76,83% for the worst and best 
performing strategies respectively (with regards to net returns, and not risk adjusted 
returns). Similarly, after-fee returns ranged from 27,87% to 49,87%. In addition, for 
the period 2002/06/11 to 2012/04/26, the cumulative before-fee returns of all 8 Pairs 
trading strategies ranged from 333,53% to 564,50% and outperformed the ALSI 
(170,30%). Furthermore, despite the substantial drag on before-fee returns that arose 
as a result of the high frequency of trades required to engage in Pairs trading, the 
cumulative after-fee returns ranged from 158,22% to 341,50%. Thus, despite the high 
frequency of trading substantially decreasing the after-fee returns, only 1 out of the 8 
Pairs trading strategy underperformed the ALSI on an after brokerage costs basis. It 
remains to be seen whether the outperformance would be eroded by scrip borrowing 
costs or not.  
  
 The statistically significant outperformance of Pairs trading is a violation of 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), even in its Weak Form. The Weak Form 
EMH states that an investor cannot generate significant outperformance through 
information contained in past prices, while Pairs trading appears to have significantly 
outperformed the ALSI by arbitraging diversions from a historic price relationship.  
 
 A consequence of a Pairs trading strategy having equal long and short 
positions and, furthermore, pairs tended to naturally pair from the same sector, is that 
a Pairs trading strategy is generally fairly close to being market neutral. The market 
neutrality becomes even greater when sector restrictions were imposed, due to the 
paired shares being more fundamentally similar when from the same sector (as they 
are influenced by the same external variables). This is evident in the low resultant 
standard deviations of all of the Pairs trading strategies. The average Unrestricted 
Pairs trading strategy’s standard deviations ranged from 0,06 to 0,11. The effect of 
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imposing sector restrictions on portfolios resulted in marginal reductions in the 
resultant standard deviations when compared to their respective Unrestricted 
portfolios. To illustrate this, the Sector Restricted (2;-2) strategy yielded a standard 
deviation of 0,10 and the Unrestricted (2;-2) strategy yielded a standard deviation of 
0,11. 
 
 Significantly, and in contradiction to the findings of Gatev et al. (2006) and 
Do and Faff (2009), the Unrestricted sample of pairs outperformed its comparative 
Sector Restricted portfolios with respect to both before- and after-fee returns. 
Applying a sector restriction to the construction of portfolios did however result in 
marginally decreased standard deviations as a result of pairing shares that are more 
fundamentally similar, and therefore exposed to similar macroeconomic factors. 
However, significantly, under all three Sector Restricted strategies that were tested, 
the reductions in returns (when compared to the Unrestricted sample) were relatively 
larger than the reductions in standard deviations. Therefore the before- and after-fee 
Sharpe Ratios of the Sector Restricted portfolios lagged those of their comparable 
Unrestricted portfolios. Before- and after-fee Sharpe Ratios (calculated over cash due 
to the low risk nature of Pairs trading and the self-funding nature of Pairs trading – 
the formula justification is supplied in the methodology) of the Sector Restricted 
strategies ranged from 6.96 to 7.82 and 3.02 to 4.15 respectively. The comparative 
(excluding un (3;-0,5) and un (2;-1) as they aren’t comparative portfolios) 
Unrestricted Sharpe Ratios were 7.16 to 7.99 and 3.16 to 4.39 respectively. Therefore, 
applying sector restrictions to the formation of pairs for a Pairs trading strategy on the 
JSE appears to have resulted in underperformance relative to a strategy trading a 
portfolio of pairs constructed in the absence of sector restrictions, despite the 
marginally reduced risk. Of further significance, under the Unrestricted sample, a 
weak positive relationship between the number of mixed pairs (from different sectors) 
in a portfolio and the return yielded was observed, further indicating that an 
Unrestricted sample of pairs is likely to yield improved relative performance on the 
JSE.  
 
 Significantly, reiterating the conclusions of prior literature, returns (before- 
and after-fee) were found to have declined substantially over time. The average 
before-fee (after-fee) returns declined substantially under the best performing strategy 
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(based on returns, and not risk-adjusted returns), from 39,16% (28,48%) in the first 
quarter of the study to 23,70% (13,65%) in the last quarter of the study. The declining 
returns occurred for all strategy iterations tested in this study. This is a phenomenon 
that has been documented on the S&P500 by Gatev et al. (2006) and Do and Faff 
(2009), the Turkish stock exchange by Bolgun et al. (2009) and the Brazilian stock 
exchange by Perlin (2007). However, while Do and Faff (2009) concluded that, on 
average, the after-fee returns yielded by Pairs trading on the S&P500 had become 
statistically insignificant over time, it appears that economically and statistically 
significant after-fee returns remain achievable on the JSE through a Pairs trading 
strategy. It remains to be seen whether this outperformance is completely eroded, to 
the point of statistical insignificance, over time, as it appears to have on the S&P500. 
In addition to the declining returns over time, the standard deviation of returns yielded 
by Pairs trading appears to have also declined over time, from 0,125 to 0,086 for the 
best performing strategy. It was surmised by Gatev et al. (2006) that the decline in 
both returns and standard deviations yielded by Pairs trading over time could be due 
to a declining exposure to an unknown latent risk factor.  
 Significantly, despite returns declining over time, returns yielded by Pairs 
trading appear to have increased substantially during periods of increased market 
stress, due to the elevated levels of market volatility. Most notably from the middle of 
2007 until the middle of 2009 all of the Pairs trading strategies appear to have yielded 
increased relative returns. Furthermore, substantially higher returns were yielded in 
the first period of the study (late 1998). While this period was a period of increased 
market stress, the outcome could be an outlier due to it being an isolated and drastic 
spike in returns. 
 
 A number of different opening and closing parameters were tested. The base 
set of rules, as chosen with reference to prior literature, was the (2;0) strategy. Under 
the (2;0) strategy, a pair would be opened when the normalized prices of the paired 
shares were at a 2 standard deviation spread from their historical mean, and closed at 
the subsequent convergence (to the historical mean) of the normalized prices (a 0 
standard deviation spread). The average annualized after-fee return of the Unrestricted 
(2;0) strategy was 29,47% and the Sharpe Ratio (over cash) was 3.16.  
The opening signal of 2 standard deviations appears to have remained the best 
performing opening parameter when compared to the other opening parameter that 
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was tested, namely 3 standard deviations. This was a result of a more substantial 
number of pairs opening in each trading period (on average 19,86 of the 20 pairs 
opened in every trading period and comparatively only 17,28 pairs opened under the 3 
standard deviation opening signal). A higher number of pairs opening in a trading 
period results in a more substantial number of sources of return generation for the 
strategy. However, the closing parameter of 0 standard deviations was found to be 
sub-optimal, and altering the closing parameter resulted in improved performance of 
the Pairs trading strategy.  
It appears to be beneficial to the returns yielded by a Pairs trading strategy to 
have a longer (wider spread) holding period for each pair that opens. A longer holding 
period serves to increase the return generated by each pair that opens and closes. A 
closing parameter of -0,5 standard deviations (the pairs are only closed when the 
relative prices of the shares move by a half standard deviation spread in the opposite 
direction to when it opened) resulted in the highest Sharpe Ratio (risk adjusted return 
measure); an average annualized before-fee (after-fee) return of 70,54% (37,88%) and 
Sharpe Ratio of 7.99 (3.88). Furthermore, a closing parameter of -2 standard 
deviations resulted in the highest before- and after-fee returns; an average annualized 
before-fee (after-fee) return of 76,83% (49,87%) and Sharpe Ratio of 7.16 (4.39). 
 
 Further analysis was done on the Top20 portfolio, to determine which pairs 
within it yielded superior risk and return characteristics, namely, the pairs with the 
closer or weaker historical price relationships. This was done through creating an 
additional 2 portfolios within the Top20 portfolio, one of the 5 closest pairs and 
another of the 5 weakest pairs. The results arising from this were mixed, and therefore 
it is inconclusive whether closer pairing is beneficial or detrimental to Pairs trading 
returns. 
 
 It therefore appears that Pairs trading has been, and continues to be, a low risk 
strategy capable of yielding significantly positive before- and after-fee returns on the 
JSE. However, it remains to be tested whether the returns yielded by Pairs trading are 
resilient to the additional costs associated with scrip borrowing that is required to 
short the shares in the market. Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether the 
observed declining profitability of the strategy will continue into the future and follow 
the suit of the S&P500 and begin to yield insignificant returns.  
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9  Appendix 
 
Detail for Tables: 
R= Return 
SD = Standard Deviation 
SR = Sharpe Ratio 
ASSD = Average Sum of Squared Distances 
ANOP = Average Number of Open Pairs 
MR = Monthly Return 
NoT = Number of Trades 
ATL = Average Trade Length 
RPT = Return Per Trade 
 
Calculated as follows: 
 
ASSD:  The average of the sum of the Sum of Squared Distances of the 20 
pairs that make up the portfolio. 
 
ANOP:  The number of open pairs is tracked daily, and averaged for the entire 
trading period. 
 
MR:  The 125 day (roughly 6 months) return is converted to an annual return, 
and then to a monthly return using the equations: 
   
Annual: 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 = (1+ 𝑟)! − 1 
 
  Monthly: 𝑅𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 =    (1+ 𝑟)!" − 1 
 
 
NoT:  A binary calculation is input to excel to return a 1 when a position is 
opened, else a 0. Another binary calculation is input to return a 1 when 
a position is closed, else a 0. At the end of each period, these are 
summed to give the number of trades put on. This figure is then 
multiplied by two, as each trade that is opened or closed requires a 
long position to be taken in one stock and a short position in another.  
 
ATL: The total number of days each pair is open is calculated, and then all 
20 are summed. This number is divided by the number of pair trades 
opened (half of the NoT), to ascertain the average length a pair is open. 
 
RPT:  The trading period return is divided by the NoT. 
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Table 11.1 - Stock Ticker, Name and Sector 
Ticker Name Sector 
ASA Barclays Africa Group Ltd (Now BGA) Findi 
AIP Adcock Ingram Holdings Ltd Findi 
AFE Aeci Ltd Findi 
ARI African Rainbow Minerals Ltd Resi 
ABL African Bank Investments Ltd Findi 
AGL Anglo American PLC Resi 
AMS Anglo American Platinum Ltd Resi 
ANG AngloGold Ashanti Ltd Resi 
ACL ArcelorMittal South Africa Ltd Resi 
APN  Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd Findi 
AEG Aveng Ltd Findi 
AVI AVI Ltd Findi 
BAW Barloworld Ltd Findi 
BIL BHP Billiton PLC Resi 
BVT Bidvest Group Ltd Findi 
BAT Brait SE Findi 
CPL Capital Property Fund  Findi 
CSO Intu Properties PLC (now ITU) Findi 
CFR Cie Financiere Richemont SA Findi 
CLS Clicks Group Ltd Findi 
CML Coronation Fund Managers Ltd Findi 
DTC DataTec Ltd Findi 
DSY Discovery Ltd Findi 
EXX Exxaro Resources Ltd Resi 
FSR FirstRand Ltd Findi 
FPT  Fountainhead Property Trust Findi 
GFI Gold Fields Ltd Resi 
GRT Growthpoint Properties Ltd Findi 
HAR Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd Resi 
HCI Hosken Consolidated Investments Ltd Findi 
HYP Hyprop Investments Ltd Findi 
ILV Illovo Sugar Ltd Resi 
IMP Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd Resi 
IPL Imperial Holdings Ltd Findi 
INL Investec Ltd Findi 
INP Investec PLC Findi 
JDG JD Group Ltd South Africa Findi 
KIO Kumba Iron Ore Ltd Resi 
LBH Liberty Holdings Ltd Findi 
LON Lonmin PLC Resi 
MSM Massmart Holdings Ltd Findi 
MDC Mediclinic International Ltd Findi 
MMI MMI Holdings Ltd South Africa Findi 
MNP Mondi PLC Resi 
MPC Mr Price Group Ltd Findi 
MTN MTN Group Ltd Findi 
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MUR Murray & Roberts Holdings Ltd Findi 
NPK Nampak Ltd Findi 
NPN Naspers Ltd Findi 
NED Nedbank Group Ltd Findi 
NTC Netcare Ltd Findi 
NHM Northam Platinum Ltd Resi 
OML Old Mutual PLC Findi 
PIK Pick n Pay Stores Ltd Findi 
PFG Pioneer Foods Ltd Findi 
PPC PPC Ltd Findi 
RDF Redefine Properties Ltd Findi 
REI Reinet Investments SCA Findi 
REM Remgro Ltd Findi 
RES Resilient Property Income Fund Ltd Findi 
RLO Reunert Ltd Findi 
RMH RMB Holdings Ltd Findi 
SAB SABMiller PLC Findi 
SLM Sanlam Ltd Findi 
SNT Santam Ltd Findi 
SAP Sappi Ltd Resi 
SOL Sasol Ltd Resi 
SHP Shoprite Holdings Ltd Findi 
SPP The Spar Group Ltd Findi 
SBK Standard Bank Group Ltd Findi 
SHF Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd Findi 
TKG Telkom SA SOC Ltd Findi 
TFG The Foschini Group Ltd Findi 
TBS Tiger Brands Ltd Findi 
TON Tongaat Hulett Ltd Resi 
TRE Trencor Ltd Findi 
TRU Truworths International Ltd Findi 
TSH Tsogo Sun Holdings Ltd Findi 
VOD Vodacom Group Ltd Findi 
WHL Woolworths Holdings Ltd South Africa Findi 
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Table 11.2 – A Portion of the SSD Matrix (Chosen Pairs Highlighted) 
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Figure 10 – Normalized Prices of Paired Shares + Open/Close of the Pair 
 
